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Private Bar Delivery of Civil Legal
Services to the Poor: A Design For a
Combined Private Attorney and
Staffed Office Delivery System
By ANDREA J. SALTZMAN*
In 1876, a group of citizens in New York City opened an office
with one part-time staff attorney "to render legal aid and assistance
gratuitously to those of German birth who may appear worthy thereof,
but who from poverty are unable to procure it."' Twelve years later,
this staffed legal aid office, the first such in the country,2 no longer re-
stricted its services to German immigrants, and another staffed legal
aid office serving all those in need of legal assistance but unable to
afford it opened in Chicago.3
Other cities began following the lead of New York and Chicago.
In 1900, a staffed legal aid office was opened in Boston and one year
* Former staff attorney, Litigation Unit, San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assist-
ance Foundation; directing attorney, Conta Costa Legal Services Foundation; consultant,
Legal Services Corporation. B.A., 1967, Bryn Mawr College; M.A., 1969; J.D., 1972, Uni-
versity of California at Berkeley.
This Article was adapted from a report prepared for the five Illinois Legal Services
Corporation (LSC) grantees on the design and implementation of a private attorney compo-
nent of a staff attorney program. Because it was adapted from a consultant report for LSC
grantees, the author had the advantage of attending LSC conferences on the use of private
attorneys in the delivery of legal services to the poor and using unpublished materials com-
piled by the LSC Chicago Regional Office on this topic. There are, consequently, citations
to comments at conferences and to unpublished materials. All unpublished materials may
be obtained from the LSC. Much is also on file with the HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL.
Special thanks are due to the five Illinois LSC grantees and, in particular, to Joseph
Bartylak, Executive Director of Land of Lincoln Legal Aid and head of the Illinois LSC
State Support Unit. Also, special thanks to the staff of the LSC Chicago Regional Office.
The views expressed herein are those of the author.
1. E. BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 7 (1951).
2. Starting in 1865, the Freedman's Bureau attempted to provide free legal assistance
to newly freed Blacks in the District of Columbia and some southern states, but the scope of
its activities is unclear and one cannot say that the Freedman's Bureau truly operated an
organized legal aid office. See Westwood, Getting Justice for the Freedman, 16 How. L.J.
492, 504-06 (1971).
3. E. BROWNELL, supra note 1, at 7.
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later staffed legal aid offices were opened in Philadelphia, Pittsburgh,
and Newark.4 By 1917, forty-one cities had some type of legal aid of-
fice.5 By 1964, there were 250 staffed civil legal aid offices around the
country.6 The idea of meeting the civil legal needs of the poor by open-
ing an office employing salaried lawyers and providing services free of
charge to eligible clients had taken root in this country. 7
Thus, in 1965, when the federal government, as part of President
Johnson's "War on Poverty," began to provide funds for civil legal
services for the poor through the Office of Economic Opportunity
(OEO),8 it was not surprising that the funds would go almost exclu-
sively to programs with staffed offices.9 And, in 1974, when the Legal
Services Corporation (LSC) replaced OEO as the agency chiefly re-
sponsible for dispensing federal funds for civil legal services for the
poor, 10 it again was not surprising that those funds would continue to
4. Id. at 8.
5. E. JOHNSON, JR., JUSTICE AND REFORM, THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE LEGAL
OEO LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 6 (1974).
6. SECTION ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AND THE STANDING
COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, A.B.A. JOINT INFORMATIONAL
REPORT, THE CORPORATION FOR LEGAL SERVICES: A STUDY 9 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
JOINT INFORMATIONAL REPORT].
7. No one could argue, however, that all, or even a large portion, of the civil legal
needs of the poor were being met by the 250 staffed legal aid offices existing in 1964. Indeed,
it has been estimated that these 250 offices met approximately five percent of the poor's legal
needs. JOINT INFORMATIONAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 9. Moreover, in 1964, 9 cities with a
population of 1,000,000 or more, 15 slightly smaller communities, and 105 rural centers with
over 100,000 in population had no legal aid offices. H. STUMPF, COMMUNITY POLITICS AND
LEGAL SERVICES: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE LAW 124 (1975).
8. OEO was established by the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C §§ 2701-
2995 (1976) (repealed in part by the Act of December 28, 1973. Pub. L. No. 93-203, 87 Stat.
883). The 1966 Amendments to the Act provided specific authorization to fund programs
providing legal services to the poor. Economic Opportunity Amendments of 1967 § 211 -
l(b), Pub. L. 89-794, 80 Stat. 1451, 1462 (1966) (repealed in part by Legal Services Corpora-
tion Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 378).
9. See H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 141.
10. The LSC was created by the Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-355, 88 Stat. 378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1976 & Supp. V 1981)). The LSC
is an independent corporation which provides no direct services to clients but rather grants
funds to private legal services programs throughout the country that provide the direct serv-
ices to the poor.
There are other federal sources of funds for civil legal services for the poor but the LSC,
as OEO before it, has been the chief source of such funds. As of 1980, the LSC provided
approximately two-thirds of the funding to the 322 private legal services programs in the
country while other federal sources provided about 22% of the funds and private contribu-
tions and state and local governments provided the remaining 11%. LEGAL SERVICES CORP.,
CHARACTERISTICS OF FIELD PROGRAMS SUPPORTED BY THE LEGAL SERVICES CORPORA-
TION 18-19 (1981).
The status of the LSC and the amount of funds it will have available for civil legal
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be channeled principally to staffed offices.II
What was unsurprising, however, was not without considerable
controversy. There were those who argued that a delivery system other
than the staffed office system should be instituted.' 2 They proposed
instead "judicare," a delivery system in which private attorneys would
be compensated by the government on a fee-for-service basis for the
representation of poor people. 13
As the federal government provided more funds for civil legal
services for the poor,14 the debate between proponents of the compen-
services for the poor has been in doubt since 1980. President Reagan has proposed to elimi-
nate the LSC in the budgets he has submitted to Congress. See, e.g., OFF. OF MGMT. AND
THE BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 1982 BUDGET REVISIONS 84-85, 156 (Mar. 1981). Congress has
continued funding the LSC, though with a reduced budget, through continuing resolutions.
See H.R.J. Res. 631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R.J. Res. 325, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981). However, Congress has not passed any permanent appropriations act.
11. LEGAL SERVICES CORP., THE DELIVERY SYSTEMS STUDY: A POLICY REPORT TO
THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES at iii (1980) [hereinafter re-
ferred to and cited as DSS POLICY REPORT].
12. As used in this Article, a "delivery system" is simply the method of delivering civil
legal services in the broadest sense. See E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 117-21; see also H.
STUMPF, supra note 7, at chs. 6-7 (two case histories of local debates on the type of delivery
system to be funded by OEO).
13. Judicare, so called because it is the legal analog of Medicare, is also known as the
"English System," the "compensated private attorney model," or simply the "private attor-
ney" or "private bar" system. The staffed office system is often referred to as the "neighbor-
hood office system," the "legal aid model," or the "staff attorney model."
14. As of June 30, 1966, OEO had provided $20 million for civil legal services for the
poor. By 1972, the OEO annual legal services budget had grown to $61 million. E. JOHN-
SON, JR., supra note 5, at 369. The LSC budget grew from $90 million in its first fiscal year,
42 U.S.C. § 2996i (1976), to $321.3 million in fiscal year 1981, Pub. L. No. 96-536, 94 Stat.
3166 (1980).
Of course, the LSC and the independent programs it finances have not been the only
providers of civil legal services to the poor. Private lawyers have always provided such
services on an informal, unorganized basis. See D. MADDI & F. MERRILL, THE PRIVATE
PRACTICING BAR AND LEGAL SERVICES FOR Low INCOME PEOPLE (1971). There are also
formal programs that provide such services without federal funding or a formal connection
with any LSC funded program. In San Francisco, for example, in addition to the primarily
LSC-financed San Francisco Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation (SFNLAF), there
are, inter alia: the Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, a program that existed before SF-
NLAF; several independent offices serving the legal needs of special groups, such as the
Japanese (Nihomachi Legal Outreach) or juveniles (Legal Services for Children); The Law-
yer's Committee for Urban Affairs, a bar association supported organizatioitthat has repre-
sented poor people in civil suits by using a combination of staff and volunteer private
attorneys; Public Advocates, a privately funded public interest law firm that also has repre-
sented poor people in civil suits; legal aid clinics in several of the law schools; and organized
pro bono efforts in several private law firms. Despite this large number of programs serving
the legal needs of the poor, the primary provider of civil legal services for the poor in San
Francisco, as in the rest of the country, is the LSC-funded program, SFNLAF. See Evans,
"Who Faysfor the Assistance of Counsel?" Current Legislative Proposals and Issues, PROC.
SECOND NAT'L CONF. ON LEGAL SERVICES AND THE PUBLIC 118, 119 (1979).
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sated private attorney and the staff attorney models increased.'- Con-
gress did not ignore this debate. In 1967, a proposal to require OEO to
encourage judicare was introduced in Congress, but was defeated. 16
The Legal Services Corporation Act, 17 passed in 1974, ackowledged
that the LSC would continue to fund predominantly staff attorney pro-
grams, but required the LSC to study "alternate methods for the eco-
nomical and effective delivery of legal services including judicare,
vouchers, prepaid legal insurance and contracts with law firms.' 18
The election of President Reagan, known for his longstanding op-
position to the existing legal services delivery system, 19 intensified the
debate.20  Strengthened by the opposition to the LSC in the Reagan
administration 21 and in Congress, 22 the proponents of judicare pressed
15. A representative sample of the literature which reported on or contributed to this
debate includes: S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE, PUBLIC FUNDS, PRIVATE LAWYERS AND POOR PEO-
PLE (1974) [hereinafter cited as S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE]; S. BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE, A
PRELIMINARY APPRAISAL (1972) [hereinafter cited as S. BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE];
CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS (1970); NAT'L LEGAL AID &
DEFENDER Ass'N, SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS (1966); Barvick, Legal Services
and the Rural Poor, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 437 (1967); Brakel, Free Legal Servicesfor the Poor-
Staffed Office Versus Judicare: The Client's Evaluation, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 532 [hereinafter
cited as Brakel, Free Services]; Brakel, Styles of Delivery of Legal Services to the Poor. A
Review Article, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 219 [hereinafter cited as Brakel, Styles];
Cole & Greenberger, Staff Attorneys vs. Judicare.'A Cost Analysis, 50 U. DET. J. URB. L. 705
(1973); Goodman & Feuillan, The Trouble with Judicare, 58 A.B.A. J. 476 (1972); Green &
Green, The Legal Profession and the Process ofSocial Change. Legal Services in England and
the United States, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 563 (1970); Johnson, An Analysis of the OEO Legal
Services Program, 38 Miss. L.J. 419 (1967); Marsh, Neighborhood Law Offices or Judicare?,
25 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 12 (1966); Masotti & Corsi, Legal Assistancefor the Poor. An
Analysis and Evaluation of Two Programs, 44 U. DET. J. URB. L. 483 (1967); Pelletier, Eng-
lish Legal Aid The Successful Experiment in Judicare, 40 U. COLO. L. REV. 10 (1967):
PRELOZNIK, Wisconsin Judicare: An Experiment in Legal Services, 57 A.B.A. J. 1179 (197 1)
[hereinafter cited as Preloznick, Wisconsin]; Preloznik, Wisconsin Judicare, 25 LEGAL AID
BRIEFCASE 91 (1967); Robb, Alternate Legal Assistance Plans, 14 CATH. LAW. 127 (1968);
Schlossberg & Weinberg, The Role of Judicare in the American Legal System, 54 A.B.A. J.
1000 (1968); Vorhees, The OEO Legal Services Program. Should the Bar Support It.. 53
A.B.A. J. 23, 27 (1967); Note, Neighborhood Law Offices. The New Wave in Legal Servicesfor
the Poor, 80 HARV. L. REV. 805 (1967).
16. H.R. 12103, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
17. See supra note 10.
18. 42 U.S.C. 2996f(g) (1976). The study, hereinafter referred to as the Delivery Sys-
tems Study, resulted in the DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11.
19. See Stashower, A Brief History of Legal Services. 10 on the Richter Scale, 38
N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 18, 20-21 (1981).
20. See Brakel, Legal Services/or the Poor in the Reagan Years, 68 A.B.A. J. 820
(1982); Cramton, Why Legal Servicesfor the Poor, 68 A.B.A. J. 550 (1982) [hereinafter cited
as Cramton, Why]; Cramton, Crisis in Legal Servicesfor the Poor, 26 VILL. L. REV. 521
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Cramton, Crisis).
21. See Cramton, Crisis, supra note 20, at 522.
22. An LSC appropriations bill, passed by the House of Representatives in 1981 but
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for the institution of that system.
This Article describes but does not join the debate between judi-
care and staff attorney proponents. Instead it proposes a hybrid deliv-
ery system, combining elements of each delivery system. It is hoped
that this proposal could satisfy both sides of the debate and, most im-
portantly, could better serve the low-income client community.23 The
Article begins with an overview of the arguments for the judicare and
the staff attorney delivery systems. It then discusses the potential of a
delivery system that combines elements of each system. Finally, the
Article sets forth a recommended design for such a combined delivery
system. 24
Private Versus Staff Attorneys: The Debate Over a Delivery
System
The Arguments for a Staff Attorney Delivery System
When OEO began funding civil legal services for the poor, its de-
cision to adopt the staff attorney delivery system instead of the compen-
not acted upon by the Senate, would have added two new sections to the Legal Services
Corporation Act. Section 8 would have required the LSC to "make available substantial
amounts of funds to provide the opportunity for legal assistance to be rendered to eligible
clients by private attorneys," while § 12(a) would have required that at least one program in
each state "provide legal assistance to eligible clients through a private bar component."
H.R. 3480, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (passed, as amended, June 19, 1981, 127 CONG. REC.
3073 (1981)).
The two appropriation bills before the Senate in 1981 also encouraged use of private
attorneys in the delivery of legal services. S. 939, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); S. 1533, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
23. The proposed delivery system may also be used by existing LSC-supported staff
attorney programs as a model in their efforts to meet the requirement of the LSC that all
recipients of funds in 1982 allocate a "substantial amount" of at least 10% of their basic
grant "to provide the opportunity for the involvement of private attorneys in the delivery of
legal assistance to eligible clients." 46 Fed. Reg. 61,017(l) (1981) [hereinafter referred to as
the Private Attorney Involvement Instruction]. Of course, there are many other ways that
programs could meet this requirement. See Smith, The 1982 Private Attorney Involvement
Effort.' A Status Report, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 183 (1983).
24. This Article assumes that federal funding for civil legal services for the poor will
continue and that the LSC will remain in its present form. However, the proposed delivery
system need not be restricted in its application to LSC grantees. A privately funded legal aid
society could use the proposed design, for example, to set up a staffed office -with a compen-
sated private attorney component while a state or local bar association could use the design
to deliver legal services to the poor by employing staff attorneys to deliver these services in
combination with compensated private attorneys.
This Article also assumes that the private attorneys who participate in the combined
delivery system will be compensated, but the basic design of the system and many of the
specific recommendations are equally applicable to a combined staff attorney, pro bono pri-
vate attorney delivery system.
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sated private attorney system was not simply a decision to continue the
existing legal aid system with increased funds derived from a different
source. Although they adopted the staff office approach, the early lead-
ers of OEO actually perceived their programs as a rejection of the
traditional legal aid system, with its conservative service orientation
and its downtown offices. 25 They opted for a neighborhood office sys-
tem 26 in which staff lawyers, working in community offices, would help
wage the war on poverty.2 7 They rejected, as antithetical to their law
reform/social change perspective,28 both the conservative legal aid
model and the "English System," with its open panel of compensated
private attorneys. 2 9 E. Clinton Bamberger, Jr., the first director of the
OEO legal services program, stated:
I do not believe that an "English system" which parcels out the legal
problems of the poor to lawyers engaged not because they have a
singular dedication to assist poor people but because they are mem-
bers of a bar association or a lawyer referral panel and somehow
"chosen freely" by the poor will ever provide the necessary concerted
and thoughtful legal analysis and challenge which must occur if the
OEO program will be more than a chain of legal first-aid clinics. 30
Thus, the first argument given for the staffed office system, and the
main argument of the early leaders of federally funded legal services, is
that full-time staff attorneys are more dedicated to serving the poor and
are more likely to engage in law reform activities and to develop broad
legal attacks on poverty problems than are compensated private attor-
neys, who are identified with the interests they serve in their private
practices. 3' A related argument is that full-time staff attorneys are
more likely to see patterns in the day-to-day problems that arise and
are more likely to devise efficient and effective ways of dealing with or
eliminating those problems. 32 Faced with more demand for their serv-
ices than their limited resources can meet, full-time staff attorneys de-
velop priorities and allocate their resources in a way that will
25. See, e.g., H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 141-44.
26. As advocated by Edgar and Jean Calm in their article, The War on Poverty. A
Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1334 (1964).
27. E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 32-34; Shriver, Legal Services and The War on
Poverty, 14 CATH. LAW. 92, 96 (1968).
28. See H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 143.
29. E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 117-21.
30. id. at 120.
31. See H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 250; Cramton, Why, supra note 20, at 553: Dooley,
Legal Services for the Poor. The Debate Between Staffed Programs and Judicare. 17
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 193, 198-99 (1983); Masotti & Corsi, supra note 15, at 496; Vorhees.
supra note 15, at 27; Note, supra note 15, at 849.
32. See Cramton, Crisis, supra note 20, at 534-35; Dooley, supra note 31, at 198-99.
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contribute to social change.3 3 They address issues that transcend indi-
vidual interest while private attorneys do not.34 Moreover, because
staff attorneys generally work in community offices and see the com-
munity's poor on a daily basis, they are more likely to develop a sense
of the community and its needs, and, of greatest importance, to develop
expertise in areas of the law of vital concern to poor people, such as
welfare law or public housing law.3 5 This expertise contributes to de-
velopments and changes in these areas of the law.36 In short, the
staffed office model is argued to have more law reform potential than
the private bar model.3 7
Second, it is argued that the quality of staff attorneys' work is bet-
ter than that of compensated private attorneys because of staff attor-
neys' expertise in poverty law.38 Private attorneys, even those engaged
injudicare work, would not have or develop an expertise in this area of
the law.39 Further, the quality of staff attorneys' work is argued to be
superior to that of compensated private attorneys because staff attor-
neys tend to be hard-working, committed attorneys who have chosen to
represent the poor despite their own low salaries, while private attor-
neys who agree to participate in judicare programs tend to be inexperi-
enced or marginally successful attorneys who take judicare cases,
despite low compensation, because they need the experience or the
money.40 Moreover, it is argued that even the best private attorneys
would not give the time and attention to their judicare work that they
33. Dooley, supra note 3 1, at 199; Goodman & Feuilan, supra note 15, at 481.
34. See generally Gordley, Variations on a Modern Theme, in TOWARDS EQUAL JUS-
TICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIETIES 77, 105 (M. Cappelleti,
J. Gordley & E. Johnson, Jr., eds. 1975).
35. Green & Green, supra note 15, at 598; Schlossberg & Weinberg, supra note 15, at
1004.
36. See generally Johnson, Further Variations and the Prospect of Some Future Themes,
in TOWARDS EQUAL JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LEGAL AID IN MODERN SOCIE-
TIES 133 (M. Cappelleti, J. Gordley & E. Johnson, Jr., eds. 1975).
37. Because this Article is not concerned with the validity of the arguments for the two
opposing delivery systems but rather is concerned with resolving the debate between propo-
nents of the two systems by proposing a compromise delivery system, no attempt is made
herein to present the arguments of judicare proponents in response to this or subsequent
arguments. Similarly, no rebuttal arguments will be presented when the affirmative judicare
arguments are set forth.
38. Masotti & Corsi, supra note 15, at 495-97; Marsh, supra note 15, at 14; Vorhees,
supra note 15, at 27; Note, supra note 15, at 849.
39. Robb, supra note 15, at 133-34.
40. E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 119. See Eisenberg, The Role ofthe Private Bar in
the Delivery of Legal Services to Indigent Persons Charged with Criminal Offenses, 17
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 221, 224 (1983) (making this point in the criminal law context).
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would give to their more lucrative private work.4' Finally, the quality
of staff attorneys' work is argued to be superior to that of compensated
private attorneys because of the quality control mechanisms that one
can employ in staffed offices.42
Third, it is argued that combining staff attorneys' expertise in pov-
erty law with their ability to develop efficient and effective means of
dealing with repetitive problems results in a staff attorney delivery sys-
tem that is less costly than a compensated private attorney system.43
Indeed, it is asserted that full-time staff attorneys, with their low sala-
ries and their simple storefront offices in low-rent districts, can handle
more cases for less money than compensated private attorneys,
whatever the relative expertise. 44 Even if the level of compensation for
private attorneys is kept low, 45 the administrative costs of a judicare
system may be high, eliminating any real savings.46
Finally, it is argued that staff attorneys may provide a wider range
and a greater amount of services to the poor than compensated private
attorneys. Staffed offices often have social workers, community work-
ers, or legal assistants who come from the community where the office
is located. They have staff attorneys who are dedicated to serving the
poor. Thus they are more likely to deal with the "whole person" than
are private attorneys who would be inclined to work on discrete legal
problems.47 Staffed offices may engage readily in community educa-
tion and preventive law.48 They are better able to represent both or-
ganized and unorganized client groups.49 Because of the accessibility
and visibility of a staffed neighborhood office, its ability to foster poor
41. Robb, supra note 15, at 134, 151-52.
42. Swanson, Judicare."An LSC Regional Director Takes a Look, 37 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEF-
CASE 97, 98 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Swanson, Takes a Look]; Swanson. Judicare: How
One Staff Program Director Sees 1., 37 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 102. 103 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Swanson, Director Sees It].
43. Johnson. supra note 36, at 140-55.
44. Robb, supra note 15, at 135.
45. This may be at some cost to quality. See Eisenberg. supra note 40, at 225-26.
46. Gordley, supra note 34, at 103-04. The social cost ofjudicare may also be high. If
a large percentage of lawyers participate injudicare, these lawyers would become dependent
on and subject to regulation by the government. Robb, supra note 15. at 136. There would
be a "socialization of the legal profession" in America, E. JOHNSON. JR., supra note 5. at
238-39, and a concomitant need for a powerful national bar to control and regulate the legal
profession, Schlossberg & Weinberg, supra note 15. at 1004.
47. See Masotti & Corsi, supra note 15, at 496; Robb.supra note 15, at 134: Note. .pra
note 15. at 811. Indeed. judicare proponents have criticized legal aid offices precisely be-
cause they address more than discrete legal problems. Dooley, supra note 31. at 198-99.
48. See generall Note, supra note 15, at 820-22 (preventive law consists of efforts, such
as "legal check-ups," that prevent legal problems from occurring).
49. See generaly Johnson, supra note 36, at 208-17.
(Vol. 34
COMBINED DELIVERY SYSTEM
people's trust, and its community education efforts, the poor are more
likely to seek legal assistance from a staffed office than from compen-
sated private attorneysA0 A neighborhood law office, it is thus argued,
"reaches far more persons in equal time" than a judicare program.5 1
The Arguments for a Private Attorney Delivery System
As noted, when the federal government began funding civil legal
services for the poor, the legal aid staffed office approach was the domi-
nant model in the United States. However, there were other models
from which advocates of the judicare approach could draw. In Eng-
land, a national judicare program had been operational since 1950.52
In this country there long had been panels of volunteer lawyers who
would take civil cases free of charge for indigents referred to them by a
local bar association or a social services agency.5 3 Moreover, court-
appointed, compensated private attorneys had been representing indi-
gent criminal defendants in this country for a number of years.54 The
newly enacted health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid,5 5 which
substituted private doctors for public hospitals and clinics in the treat-
ment of the poor, provided a model by analogy.5 6
The advocates ofjudicare in the United States drew on these mod-
els and added new features to formulate their arguments.5 7 These ar-
guments are repeated today to justify a compensated private attorney
system.58
50. Cf. Green & Green, supra note 15, at 598; Pelletier, supra note 15, at 41.
51. Schlossberg & Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1004.
52. The program was established by the Legal Aid and Advice Act of 1949, 12 & 13
Geo. 6, ch. 5 1. See Pelletier, supra note 15, for a full description of the English system.
53. E. BROWNELL, supra note 1, at 104.
54. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 222.
55. Medicare and Medicaid were established in 1965 by Pub. L. No. 89-97 tit. I,
§§ 102(a), 121(a), 79 Stat. 291, 343 (1965) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (1976 & Supp.
V 1981)).
56. See Some Thoughts Concerning Private Attorney Involvement in the 1980s, 17
CLEARINGHOUSE Rnv. 175, 178-82 (1983) (interesting analysis of the validity of drawing this
analogy, by members of the editorial board).
57. E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 118.
58. It has been suggested that a preference for the judicare system over the staff attor-
ney system, and vice versa, may stem from one's basic philosophical approach to govern-
ment funding of civil legal services for the poor. According to this theory, if one believes
that the government should fund legal services for the poor as part of its welfare program
and as part of its attack on poverty (legal aid as a "welfare right," the "social utilitarian"
approach), one would probably prefer the staffed office model. If one believes that the gov-
ernment should fund legal services for the poor to ensure equal access to justice and to
implement the right to legal aid (legal aid as a "juridical right," the "equal access" ap-
proach), one would probably prefer judicare. See, e.g., Gordley, supra note 34, at 86-88,
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First, the advocates of judicare argue that judicare provides the
poor with freedom of choice. Instead of assigning an applicant for le-
gal services to one of a small number of staff attorneys in a small office,
the applicant may choose any lawyer willing to participate in the pro-
gram.59 Legal services clients should prefer such a freedom of choice
over a staffed office system. 60
Second, the proponents of judicare argue that this freedom of
choice, along with the other essential feature ofjudicare, service by pri-
vate attorneys, minimizes the stigmatization of the poor. Poor persons
seeking legal services are placed in the same position as others. 6' They
are not sent to "separate but equal" law offices or subjected to a differ-
ent brand of justice than the rich.62 With judicare, the poor are not
treated like a "neatly demarked class needing special legal treatment
administered through a separate legal aid establishment. ' 63
Third, it is argued that the abandonment of the "separate but
equal" neighborhood office concept in favor of the involvement of
large numbers of private attorneys in the delivery of legal services to
the poor is highly advantageous. The more lawyers involved with the
legal services program, the more politically powerful the program will
be, and the more organized bar will contribute to making it a success. 64
Moreover, the poor potentially will have the benefit of the experience
of the entire bar6 5 and the entire bar will be sensitized to the problems
of the poor.66
Fourth, it is argued that private lawyers are less vulnerable to
109-12. See generally Breger, LegalAidfor the Poor. A ConceptualAnalysis, 60 N.C.L. REV.
282 (1982). This theory has been questioned by both staff and private attorney proponents,
see Johnson, supra note 36, at 136-37; Brakel, Styles, supra note 15, at 222, and is not partic-
ularly useful herein although it does provide a theoretical framework for the arguments
canvassed in this Article.
It has also been suggested that a prime motivation for judicare proposals is financial:
that is, private attorneys favorjudicare because judicare will enrich them. Cf. Dooley, supra
note 31, at 199; Robb, supra note 15, at 139-40. While it is undoubtedly true that economic
considerations motivate some judicare proponents, a far larger number appear to be moti-
vated by the ideological and political considerations discussed infra. See H. STUMPF, supra
note 7, at 246.
59. E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 238; H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 239.
60. Brakel, Free Services, supra note 15, at 548.
61. Pelletier, supra note 15, at 42.
62. H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 208.
63. Brakel, supra note 20, at 821.
64. See Robb, supra note 15, at 137; Schlossberg & Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1003.
65. Robb, supra note 15, at 137.
66. H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 208-09.
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political interference than staff lawyers.67 Since they are not employees
of programs with non-lawyer directors,68 they are better able to pre-
serve the traditional attorney-client relationship. 69 Judicare propo-
nents note that private attorneys will accept or reject cases based on the
clients' desires and the merits of each case. Staff attorneys, faced with
invariably limited resources, will decide which cases to accept or reject
based on their own perception of the needs of the community and their
own agendas.70
Fifth, it is argued that judicare makes more sense than a staff at-
torney system in rural areas where the poor are widely dispersed.71
Placing staffed offices in areas where there are few poor people is not
economically practical, particularly when there are able private attor-
neys practicing in these areas.72
Finally, some judicare proponents make a political argument.
They assert that if the judicare system has a limited potential for law
reform,73 this is as it should be. The government should not be financ-
ing social activism; staff lawyers, supported by the government, should
not be "stirring up" litigation.74 They assert that individual clients
come to legal services offices with basic legal problems; they need and
want help with these problems, not law reforming class actions that
may be opposed by other eligible clients.7 5
67. Johnson, supra note 36, at 172; Schlossberg & Weinberg, supra note 15, at 1003;
Note, supra note 15, at 849.
68. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 1007(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(c) (1976)
(requiring a board of directors composed of at least 60% attorneys from state where located
and one eligible client).
69. Pelletier, supra note 15, at 14; Preloznik, Wisconsin, supra note 15, at 1182.
70. Breger, supra note 58, at 320-28; Dooley, supra note 3 1, at 198-99; Gordley, supra
note 34, at 125-27.
71. Preloznik, Wisconsin, supra note 15, at 1180.
72. H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 243.
73. But see Pelletier, supra note 15, at 39-41.
74. As noted in E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, a 1969 conference of private practition-
ers advocating judicare issued a statement providing: "Any program of free legal services
should be restricted to customary legal services to the individual and should not include
advocacy for social reform or influencing legislation." Id. at 374 n.26. See also Cramton,
9%y, supra note 20, at 556; Dooley, supra note 31, at 198-99.
75. In Brakel, supra note 20, the author objected to the pre-Reagan Administration
legal services' tendency "to emphasize group representation and so-called impact litigation
at the expense of individual service requests." Id. at 821. This emphasis, according to
Brakel:
hardly satisfied the otherwise eligible client who went unrepresented because his
problem was deemed of lesser social significance than someone else's case or cause.
Not only that, but the preferred matter-more often than not "generated" by the
attorney and some poverty group or other fictional client-might actually conflict
with the rejected client's interest. Every gratuitous foray by a legal services lawyer
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Private and Staff Attorneys: The Potential of a Combined
Delivery System
Because the arguments for a private attorney delivery system and
the arguments for a staff attorney delivery system revolve around dif-
ferent issues, they are essentially complementary rather than contradic-
tory. Thus, it is possible to reconcile the two approaches by merging
the two systems. The resultant combined delivery system, if designed
with the arguments for each of the two systems in mind, may satisfy
proponents of both systems.76 An overview of the potential of such a
combined delivery system indicates that this may very well be the case.
By employing full-time staff attorneys, a hybrid program can have
all the law reform potential of a pure staff attorney program while of-
fering clients freedom of choice through its private attorney compo-
nent. By using private attorneys on many cases, a hybrid program can
offer clients the same type of service that the more affluent receive
while developing efficient and effective ways of dealing with repetitive
legal problems through its staff attorney component.
The staff attorneys in a hybrid program can develop an expertise
in poverty law and a sensitivity to the needs of the poor and, to the
profession's great advantage, can help private practitioners acquire this
expertise and this sensitivity without a full-time commitment on their
part.77 The private attorneys in a hybrid program, on the other hand,
can give the staff attorneys, who tend to be young 78 and who are often
not from the community they serve, 79 the advantage of their experience
and their knowledge of the local community and the local courts.
Combining private and staff attorneys assures that a legal services pro-
gram will have expertise in all basic areas of the law, not just those
into pro-abortion litigation represents a disservice to the many low-income people
who oppose unrestricted choice. In opposition to the middle-class legal services
lawyer's environmental concerns are often the job opportunities of the less pnvi-
leged. There are poor landlords as well as poor tenants. And school bussing may
be opposed by low-income blacks and whites alike.
Id
76. Those judicare proponents who oppose government funded law reform, however.
will probably not be satisfied with any combined system that preserves the staffed office
system's law reform potential. This Article takes the position that law reform is a necessary
part of any civil legal strvices delivery system for the poor. Thus, the suggested combined
system has been designed to preserve the law reform potential inherent in the staffed office
model.
77. See H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 228 (judicare attorneys have developed sensitivity
to the poor, with a resultant change in attitudes, from handling judicare cases).
78. Cramton, Crisis, s'vpra note 20, at 530.
79. See H. STUMPF, supra note 7, at 250.
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areas with which only private attorneys or only staff attorneys tend to
be familiar.80 Combining private and staff attorneys "assures that there
is the cross-fertilization and freshness necessary in the delivery of legal
services to poor people."81
If it is true that private attorney delivery systems cost more than
staff attorney delivery systems on a per case basis because they cannot
develop efficient methods of dealing with repetitive problems and be-
cause administration is divorced from service, 82 a combined system
should not cost more than a pure staff attorney system. The efficient
delivery mechanisms of a pure staff program can be readily employed
in the combined program while the staff component fulfills an adminis-
trative function. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the increased in-
volvement of a large number of private attorneys in the delivery system
could increase its political power and, consequently, its funding.83
A combined system can offer all of the services that a pure staff
system offers (such as community education, law reform, and group
representation) through its staff component while offering "traditional"
handling of "traditional" cases (such as divorces and bankruptcies)
through its private attorney component.8 4 A combined system in a ru-
ral area can serve widely dispersed poor people efficiently and econom-
ically through its private bar component without losing the expertise
and law reform potential found in a staff attorney office. Moreover, the
money that could be used to hire a few staff attorneys in a few offices of
80. For example, West Virginia Legal Services Plan, Inc., a combined staff/judicare
program, did not have enough clients with problems relating to mineral rights to justify staff
developing an expertise in this law but there were enough to make private attorneys' knowl-
edge of this law a great assistance to the program. Martin, Private Attorney Involvement in
Rural Legal Services Delivery, 17 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 260, 263 (1983).
81. Eisenberg, supra note 40, at 226.
82. See supra notes 43-46 & accompanying text.
83. Earl Johnson, Jr. has stated:
Whatever the additional cost involved in incorporating private counsel into the
delivery system, it may make sense politically. It is very probable that the added
appropriations that the proponents of Judicare could generate through their polit-
ical strength would exceed the increased expense of delivering some part of the
legal assistance by this method.
E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 241.
84. It is interesting to note that Wisconsin Judicare, the major judicare project in this
country, is in reality a combined program. As noted by its first director:
Not only does Wisconsin Judicare provide wide-ranging bread-and-butter legal
services, but the staff also devotes its time to community education, seminarsfor the
private attorneys and law reform through class actions, direct appeals and legislation.
Wisconsin Judicare thus is an imaginative attempt to provide both comprehensive
legal services and law reform.
Preloznik, Wisconsin, supra note 15, at 1180 (emphasis added).
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a multi-office rural program could be more efficiently distributed
throughout the program's service area if it were partially used to fund a
private attorney component. 85
Finally, at this time when federal funding for legal services is be-
ing questioned and cut back along with many other social and benefit
programs for the poor,86 wider involvement of the private bar in legal
services may mean wider attorney involvement in efforts to preserve
not only legal services, but also other social services and benefit pro-
grams. The private lawyers involved in such efforts, moreover, gener-
ally would have more political power than staff attorneys and their
clients; the assistance they could provide to staff attorneys would thus
be invaluable to the poor.817 Additionally, by compromising with the
advocates of judicare, staff attorney advocates may be able to preserve
the essential features of the staff attorney system in the face of continu-
ing attacks on that system.8 8 By adding a private bar component,
staffed legal services programs can foster better relations with the pri-
vate bar.89 Legal services staffed programs can work effectively with
the private bar; they may very well not be able to work at all against it.
Because of the potential of a well-designed combined delivery sys-
tem, Earl Johnson, Jr., a strong proponent of the neighborhood office
concept while serving as the first deputy director and the second direc-
tor of the OEO legal services program, has stated:
One tempting compromise [between the staff attorney and judicare
85. See Martin, Judicare." One Component of a Diversied Delivery System, 15
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 500, 503 (1981).
86. See Dooley & Houseman, Legal Services in the '80"s and Challenges Facing the
Poor, 15 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 704 (1982).
87. See Eisenberg, supra note 40, where he states:
I believe it is essential that the private bar have a stake in the representation of
poor people. To put it bluntly, poor people and their lawyers generally lack the
clout, both in Congress and at the local level, to make a substantial difference. It is
essential that there be private lawyers who are knowledgeable about the problems
of the poor, about the legal remedies that are open to poor people, and about the
need for reforming the system ...
Exposure of the private bar to the legal problems of the poor . . . brings a
powerful force into the battle to assist the client community.
Id. at 226. Cf. Johnson, supra note 36, at 174-75.
88. See Cramton, Crisis, supra note 20, at 543-51. Even the American Bar Association,
which has traditionally supported the staffed office concept, id. at 546, is now urging private
bar involvement in the delvivery of legal services. In September of 1980, the House of Del-
gates of the ABA approved a resolution recommending that Congress amend the Legal
Services Corporation Act "to mandate the opportunity for substantial involvement of pri-
vate lawyers in providing legal services to the poor." Lawscope, 66 A.B.A. J. 1058 (1980).
89. Martin, supra note 85, at 503. Without these improved relations, they may find
themselves defunded.
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approach] is to divide responsibility between private counsel and sal-
aried staff. Private lawyers could handle divorces, adoptions, and
similar cases in which they probably possess as much expertise as
full-time staff lawyers. Staff counsel could then concentrate on law
reform, group representation, and most cases involving welfare, con-
sumer, landlord-tenant or other problems where the dispute is be-
tween a poor person and some part of the affluent society. At first
this appears to offer the best of both worlds. 90
And Samuel Brakel, a staunch advocate of judicare, 91 has asserted:
The entire staff lawyer-private bar dichotomy tends to be overdrawn.
In many respects their interests and capacities are similar and should
be utilized in complementary fashion. This is the strength of a hy-
brid model with both staff and private lawyers. The commonalities
of the two components should be exploited for positive effect, rather
than become the focus of division and competition.92
As Johnson and Brakel have noted, the potential of a combined private
bar and staffed office delivery system is great, but such a system must
be carefully designed to maximize this potential. The following sec-
tions of this Article will discuss how to design and implement such a
combined system to preserve the strengths of both systems and elimi-
nate the weaknesses of each.
Private and Staff Attorneys: The Design of a Combined
Delivery System
General Comments on Designing a Combined Delivery System
In designing a combined private and staff attorney delivery system
it is irrelevant whether one views the ultimate product as a staff attor-
ney program with a private attorney component or a private attorney
program with a staff attorney component. The distinction between the
two types of programs would generally arise from the amount of re-
sources allocated to either the private or staff attorney components of a
given program, but it is possible that a program viewed as a private
attorney program may actually devote a significant portion of its re-
sources to its staff component and vice versa.93 One can design an ideal
90. E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 240. Johnson also has advocated a combined
system modelled on the Swedish one. In Sweden staffed offices exist side by side with a
separate judicare program. Johnson, Towards Equal Justice Revisited: Two Responses to a
Review, 1977 AM. B. RESEARCH J. 941, 943-45. See also Cramton, Crisis, supra note 20, at
546 (Professor Cramton, the first Chairman of the LSC, states: "My view is that a complete
legal services program would have staff attorney and judicare components, since each has
some advantages.").
91. See S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE, supra note 15, at 128-29.
92. Brakel, Judicare in West Virginia, 65 A.B.A. J. 1346, 1349 (1979).
93. In 1980, Wisconsin Judicare, the major judicare program in the country, devoted
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combined system, as in this Article, without making any assumptions
about the resources devoted to the two components. All that is essen-
tial is that each component receive enough funds to perform its con-
templated functions. 94
It is similarly irrelevant whether one labels the private bar compo-
nent of a combined system as a "contract" or a 'judicare" component.
In mandating that the LSC conduct a study of alternate delivery sys-
tems, Congress differentiated between the judicare and contract mod-
els.95 The report, prepared in accordance with this mandate, 96 viewed
judicare as an "open panel" system (Le., all attorneys in a particular
geographical area who wish to participate may do so) and the contract
model as a "closed panel" system (i.e., only attorneys selected by a pro-
gram's staff may participate). 97 This distinction is not inherent in the
models. 98 The opportunity to contract with a staff program may be
made available to all attorneys in a particular area, thus rendering the
over 40% of its resources to its staff component that consisted of 19 people, 10 of whom were
attorneys. Materials prepared for the LSC Conference on Private Bar Involvement, Minne-
apolis, Minn., Feb., 1981 [hereinafter cited as Minneapolis Meeting Materials].
94. One of the functions of the staff component contemplated by this Article is the
representation of clients. A staffed office which only performs administrative functions or
which only engages in non-case activity, such as advice, referrals, outreach, community edu-
cation, or training and supervision of participating attorneys, is not considered a "staffed
office" for purposes of this Article.
95. The statute mandates the study of "alternative and supplemental methods of deliv-
ery of legal services to eligible clients," specifying four different methods that must be stud-
ied, "includingjudicare... and contracts with law firms." The Legal Services Corporation
Act of 1974 § 1007(g), 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(g) (1976).
96. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11.
97. See, e.g., id. at apps. A-2 ("the judicare model is an open panel delivery system"),
A-20 ("the contract model, by definition, involves a closed panel").
98. In the "contract" model, a staffed office contracts with one or more private attor-
neys to handle particular kinds of cases (e.g., domestic relations, bankruptcies), particular
kinds of clients (e.g., Spanish-speaking clients, Native Americans) or all cases arising in a
particular geographic area. Compensation may be on a fee for service or a retainer basis.
Eligibility determinations and case intake may be done by the staffed office, by outside agen-
cies, or by the contracting attorney(s). There may or may not be a written contract.
In the "judicare" model, a staffed office uses private attorneys to handle particular
kinds of cases or, more commonly, to deliver legal services in a particular geographical area.
Compensation is generally on a fee for service basis. Eligibility determinations and case
intake may be done by the staffed office, by outside agencies, or by the participating attor-
neys. There may or may not be a written participation agreement.
The LSC, as part of the Delivery Systems Study, funded nine staff projects with "con-
tract" components. For a fuller description of this type of component and the nine contract
projects, see DSS POLicY REPORT, supra note 11, at apps. A-20 to -23.
The LSC. as part of the Delivery Systems Study, also funded four judicare components
of staff programs. In addition, four funded judicare projects had staff components and func-
tioned similarly to staffed programs with judicare components. For a fuller description of
the judicare model and these eight projects, see id. at apps. A-2 to -19.
contract component "open panel." Certain attorneys may be denied
the right to participate in a judicare component, thus rendering it
"closed panel." Moreover, a staffed office can make case assignments
in such a way that an open panel judicare program is rendered closed
panel in fact, if not in theory.
Accordingly, in designing its private bar component, a legal serv-
ices program need not decide if it should have a judicare or contract
system. The difference is only in the name. Naming a component
"judicare" rather than "contract" may have political significance be-
cause of past associations with the name "judicare,"99 but it has no
other significance. 100
It is important to consider whether one is designing a combined
legal services delivery system for a rural or an urban area. Certain
design features should remain constant whatever the program's setting,
but other features should differ depending on the location. This Article
proposes a design that is adaptable to either an urban or a rural setting,
though some-of the discussion and recommendations deal specifically
with an urban or a rural setting.101
Whether a program is rural or urban, designers of a combined le-
gal services delivery system must keep in mind the context in which the
system is to operate. 102 An actual legal services delivery system cannot
be designed in the abstract as was the hybrid in this Article. If there
are any inflexible rules for designing a combined legal services delivery
system, they are:
1) be flexible; all the components of a combined delivery system
must suit local conditions and address local concerns;
2) consult with the private bar;10 3 even if the bar's wishes are not
99. See E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 87, 95, 117-21;see also Dooley, supra note 31,
at 199-200.
100. The best name may be one that is politically neutral, suggesting neither contract
nor judicare (nor federally funded legal services). For example, Legal Services of North-
eastern Wisconsin calls its compensated private attorney component "The Compensated Pri-
vate Attorney Component," while three Delivery Systems Study "judicare" projects were
called "The California Lawyers Service," "The Legal Help Program of Northeastern Con-
necticut," and "The Legal Aid Service of the Buncombe County Bar Association."
101. For a discussion of the unique problems of a rural private attorney program, see
Barvick, supra note 15, at 549-50; Robb, supra note 15, at 146-50.
102. Gordley, supra note 34, at 131-32.
103. See Private Attorney Involvement Instruction, supra note 23, where it is stated:
"Experience has indicated that effective private attorney involvement occurs in those com-
munities where the legal services program and relevant bar organizations have been able to
work together in the design and implementation of a plan to achieve that involvement." 46
Fed. Reg. 61,018 (1981).
Because of this experience, this rule has been mandated in § IV(b) of the Instruction
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accommodated, the bar will appreciate being asked for suggestions;
and
3) consult with the community; this includes client groups, com-
munity leaders, and representatives of community service agencies.04
A final note: because most existing legal services programs use the
staffed office approach, this Article presumes that it is the private bar
component that is being added to an existing staffed office, and not vice
versa.
Type of Panel
The first consideration in designing a private bar component of a
combined delivery system is the nature of the panel: Should the panel
be open or closed?
It is recommended that all private bar components be open
panel. 105 This recommendation is based primarily on political consid-
erations. Proponents of judicare in an area may not be satisfied with a
closed panel system that could exclude many local attorneys. Even
those who have not been proponents of judicare may not approve of a
system that is ostensibly designed to involve the private bar but, in fact,
only involves selected private lawyers. 1 6 Exclusivity does not make for
popularity.
Private bar involvement should improve an existing staff pro-
gram's relationship with the private bar, but the limited involvement
necessitated by a closed panel means limited improvement. 0° Most
which provides: "The recipient shall provide the opportunity for consultations with ...
private attorneys and bar associations in the recipient's service area in the development of its
plan to provide the opportunity for the involvement of private attorneys in the provision of
legal assistance to eligible clients." Id. at 61,019.
104. This rule is also reflected in the Private Attorney Involvement Instruction. supra
note 23. Section IV(b) mandates client involvement in planning, in addition to private attor-
ney involvement, while the entire instruction stresses the need to know the community. Id.
See also Lawson, The Private Bar and the Poor: A Client Perspective 37 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEF-
cAsE 92 (1980).
105. An open panel may be required. The LSC appropriations bill that passed in the
House of Representatives in 1981 provides that in each state at least one program have a
private bar component "with open participation rights by members of the bar." H.R. 3480.
97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
106. They may not approve because they feel the responsibility of handling legal serv-
ices cases should be widely shared, Read, An Overview of Private Bar Delivery SYstems. 17
CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 229, 230 (1983), or because the economic rewards should be shared
without favoritism, Dooley, supra note 3 1, at 199, or because a closed panel restricts freedom
of choice, S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE, supra note 15, at 49.
107. The managing attorney of Legal Services of Northeast Wisconsin's open panel pri-
vate bar component believes that the program's relationship with the private bar noticeably
improved after the private bar component began operation while the Executive Director of
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importantly, limited private bar involvement in the delivery of legal
services to the poor could also limit the political advantages gained
from private bar involvement, such as increased lobbying power for
federally funded legal services.
There are also non-political reasons for choosing an open panel
system. First, while several programs have had remarkable success in
finding private attorneys to participate in their judicare components,10 8
the recruitment of private attorneys is generally not an easy process.
Other programs, particularly those in rural areas, have had problems
attracting private attorneys.10 9 Making it clear that participation will
be open to everyone, without favoritism or lengthy and intrusive ques-
tioning, should make this recruitment easier.
Second, the staff attorneys of several combined programs have
been surprised by the attorneys who have chosen to participate in their
private bar components. These attorneys would not have been se-
lected, or even identified, if there had been a closed panel system.1""
Every private attorney should be given a chance to demonstrate his or
her interest in such programs.
Third, with an open panel system more attorneys would be partici-
pating and clients would have a wider choice in selecting an attor-
ney.' 1 Although many advocates of the staffed office system consider
the freedom of choice aspect of a judicare system illusory,tt 2 and the
Western Nebraska Legal Services believes that no improvement in the program's relation-
ship with the bar occurred after its closed panel private bar component began operation.
Statement of John Cashman, Managing Attorney, "Legal Services Program Design for the
80's" Conference, Chicago, IUl., Nov. 2-4, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Design for the 80's Con-
ference]. See J. ROMERO, CONTRACTS WITH THE PRIvATE ATTORNEY: PRO'S AND CON'S 12-
13 (Office of Field Services, LSC, 1981). The difference between the two may stem from the
difference in the type of panels of the two programs.
108. Within six months of the initiation of the Legal Services of Northeast Wisconsin's
private bar program, 40 out of 200 private attorneys in the area agreed to participate. State-
ment of John Cashman at Design for the 80's Conference, supra note 107. Wisconsin Judi-
care has between 550 and 800 participating attorneys in 33 counties, Minneapolis Meeting
Materials, supra note 93; 205 out of 314 private attorneys participate in the Northwest Min-
nesota program, id.; and, in 1980, Legal Services of Arkansas had 54 out of a total of 175 to
200 attorneys participating in a relatively new program in 24 counties, id.
109. See, e.g., J. ROMERO, supra note 107, at 6-7.
110. Comments of John Fitzgerald, LSC Chicago Regional Office staff attorney, at
Meeting on Private Bar Relations, Chicago, IlL., Oct. 19, 1981 [hereinafter cited as Chicago
Private Bar Meeting].
I 11. As discussed infra notes 168-72 & accompanying text, it is recommended that cases
be referred to private attorneys by staff in light of participating attorneys' expertise and
demonstrated commitment, but it is also recommended that clients be given the opportunity
to choose an attorney prior to staff referrals.
112. See, e.g., E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at 238; H. STUMPF, Supra note 7, at 239-41;
Dooley, supra note 31, at 199.
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Delivery System Study found that freedom of choice was not abun-
dantly utilized by legal services clients in the demonstration projects
that offered it," 3 "[tihe issue of free choice has enormous political im-
portance."' 114 Any restriction on open participation may be seen as a
restriction on free choice and may consequently be unacceptable to
powerful judicare proponents whose sentiments mirror those of propo-
nents in Wisconsin, who were "most eager to point to freedom of
choice as a salient and salutory aspect of judicare.""15
Fourth, with more attorneys participating in a private bar delivery
system, there should be fewer difficulties with attorney conflicts of in-
terest. This is a particularly severe problem in rural areas where every
attorney has probably, at one time or another, represented the land-
lords, the banks, and the other people and institutions likely to be in-
volved in litigation with poor people.' 16
Finally, an open panel system may increase the involvement of
minority attorneys. As noted by Robert Harris, former President of the
National Bar Association: "For many black lawyers, who barely sur-
vive economically in their practices, j udicare offers a sensible approach
to involving the private black practitioner in the delivery of legal
services." 1 17
Of course there are difficulties with an open panel system. With a
larger panel, more paperwork and a more complex design will be re-
quired to administer each aspect of the private attorney component.'18
Demands from panel members for training, resource materials, and
assistance may become excessive. Most importantly, it may be difficult
to maintain quality with open participation. If all attorneys in an area
are free to participate without the application of established standards,
participating attorneys may not have the minimum level of competence
or commitment needed to truly aid the poor.
Nevertheless, the advantages of an open panel system outweigh
the disadvantages and what disadvantages exist can be overcome. For
example, a program in a large urban area that fears an unwieldly
113. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at v.
114. S. BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE, supra note 15, at 52.
115. Id. at 61.
116. Martin, supra note 80, at 262.
117. Harris, The Private Bar's Involvement in the Delivery of Legal Services: The Role of
the Black Lawyer. 37 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 86, 86 (1980).
118. See, e.g., infra note 173 & accompanying text (discussing the need for rational case
referral). With a large panel, an enormous amount of paperwork would be required to
make such referrals properly.
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panel'1 9 may consider an open panel in a restricted geographic area
(e.g., an Hispanic area) or for certain kinds of cases only (e.g., divorces,
bankruptcies). Even with an open panel, a legal services program can
reserve the right to remove attorneys from the panel if they fail to pro-
vide adequate representation, if they neglect their legal services work,
or if they engage in unethical or unacceptable practices. 20 Moreover, a
legal services program can impose clear and objective requirements for
panel membership (e.g., good standing with the state bar, at least two
years experience) without defeating the open panel system. Finally, an
open panel approach can be combined with carefully designed and
managed case referral and quality control systems that help to ensure
quality. 121
The Scope of the Private Bar Component
In designing their private bar components, all legal services pro-
grams must make two basic and interrelated decisions: 1) whether pri-
vate attorneys should serve clients in all geographic areas within the
program's service area or in selected areas only; and 2) whether private
attorneys should handle all types of cases or only those in specific areas
of the law.
Geographic Scope
For a rural program, it is recommended that the private attorney
component serve all geographical areas served by the program.
First, a program that uses private attorneys only in selected areas
may be perceived either as having "dumped" those areas on the private
bar or as having adandoned the clients in those areas. The latter per-
ception is particularly harmful in expansion areas 22 or in areas where
119. This fear may be unrealistic. A large number of attorneys in urban areas may not
wish to participate in a private bar component. For example, Legal Aid of Southwest Mis-
souri, headquartered in Springfield, found that only 33% of the private attorneys in its main
urban area participate in its program, compared to 80% in its rural area. Minneapolis Meet-
ing Materials, supra note 93.
120. As noted infra notes 169-73 & accompanying text, staff will be making referrals to
private attorneys. Thus, a program can tacitly remove an attorney from a panel by failing to
refer any cases to him or her. It is recommended, however, that where there is a serious
problem with an attorney's work, he or she be formally removed from the panel. Otherwise
the program may appear to be accepting the attorney's failing or misconduct and other par-
ticipating attorneys are not put on notice that serious failings or misconduct will be treated
seriously. Moreover, the case referral system may be called into question.
121. The design of such case referral and quality control systems are discussed infra note
168-73, 185-93 & accompanying text.
122. During its early years, the LSC attempted to expand services to areas which had
never been served by a legal aid program. The so-called "minimum access plan," which
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the local bar has been actively opposed to legal services. It may appear
that the active opposition caused a retreat by the traditional proponents
of increased legal services for the poor or that expansion was a mistake,
encouraging more opposition or discouraging future expansion if the
legal services budget picture improves.
Second, many legal services programs with private bar compo-
nents, even those that operate in areas that had previously been openly
hostile to the legal services concept or the staffed office approach, have
found that their relations with the private bar improved when they be-
gan operating their private bar components. A general spirit of cooper-
ation developed. 123 If the private bar delivers legal services in only
selected areas, however, while staffed offices deliver services in others,
there may be intensified competition between proponents of the two
types of delivery systems instead of this desirable spirit of cooperation.
Third, one of the strengths of the staffed office approach is the
visibility of neighborhood offices. The poor think of the local legal
services office as "their office" and turn to it for assistance. 124 Without
this visibility, the poor may never seek assistance. 25 If the bar operates
alone in selected geographic areas, the legal services program will lose
desired visibility in those areas.
Fourth, if a program does more impact work in areas served only
by staffed offices and more service work126 in areas served primarily by
the private bar, client resentment may develop. Clients in a "staff area"
may demand more handling of divorces while those in a "private bar"
area may question the overall program's failure to deal with pervasive
local problems.
Finally, since a program must develop an administrative appara-
tus to process and supervise the added private attorney work, it may be
established a goal of 2 attorneys per 10,000 poor people, led to the creation of many new
programs, primarily in rural areas. See LEGAL SERVICES CORP., ANNUAL REPORT 1978 at
33 (1978). The new programs in designated expansion areas were funded through a bidding
process which often pitted local judicare proponents against neighboring staffed office pro-
grams or local staffed office proponents. See, e.g., LEGAL SERVICES CORP., ANNUAL RE-
PORT 1979 at 21 (1979).
123. See supra note 107.
124. Dooley & Houseman, supra note 86, at 704.
125. Gordley, supra note 34, at 106-07.
126. "Impact" work, as distinguished from "service" work, is defined as law reform or
other work that goes beyond servicing the routine and traditional legal problems of individ-
ual clients in an attempt to achieve "long-lasting improvement, or avoidance of deteriora-
tion, in the living conditions of significant segments of the eligible population." DSS
POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 31.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 34
no more difficult or expensive to develop a program-wide apparatus
than a local one.
There are, however, advantages to setting up a private bar compo-
nent only in selected areas of a rural program's service area. Some
areas may be more suited for private bar delivery systems than others.
Large rural areas with small numbers of poor people or widely scat-
tered pockets of poverty may be served more economically by the pri-
vate bar. Small cities with large poor populations may be served more
economically by a staffed office. There may be no private attorneys
willing and able to participate in certain geographical areas. In addi-
tion, it is often difficult to recruit and retain participating attorneys in
rural areas.' 2 7 The smaller the geographic area with a private bar com-
ponent, the more time will be concentrated on effective recruitment and
the less time will be devoted to attorney retention. Furthermore, an
existing staffed legal services program can start a private bar compo-
nent in selected areas with the intention of expanding and modifying it
after seeing how the design works. Because changing a program's de-
sign after it is operational can be difficult, it is best to have the changes
affect as few attorneys as possible. Finally, despite the benefits of econ-
omies of scale, an administrative apparatus can become too large and
cumbersome to be effective. It may be very difficult to administer a
private bar component that serves a large area.'2 8
For an urban program, the choice between a program-wide and a
localized private bar component is less crucial and the advantages and
disadvantages of either approach are not as clear. 2 9 A program-wide
private bar component is probably the simplest and most effective to
establish, but there may be situations in which a localized component
makes sense.' 30
127. Martin, supra note 80, at 261.
128. There have been, however, some successful large private attorney programs. For
example, Legal Aid of Manitoba serves an area of 342,000 square miles, providing both civil
and criminal work through staff and private attorneys; Wisconsin Judicare serves an area of
32,000 square miles; and Northwest Minnesota Legal Services, a pure judicare program,
serves an area of 23,433 square miles. Minneapolis Meeting Materials, supra note 93.
129. Administration in a city, no matter how large, is not as difficult as in a large rural
area. Designing and implementing a private bar component and recruiting private attorneys
is easier in a city where many attorneys belong to a common bar association and read a
common legal publication. There are more attorneys in urban areas and the hostility to
legal services staffed programs generally has been far less. The legal services program,
which may have grown out of the old legal aid society, see E. JOHNSON, JR., supra note 5, at
101, will have had a long time presence in the community. It can remain visible in the poor
community even if it does not maintain offices throughout the city.
130. If an urban area has distinct and isolated ethnic communities and if there are pri-
vate lawyers who practice in or are members of these communities, a private bar component,
May/July 1983] COMBINED DELIVERY SYSTEM
Scope of Service
If private and staff attorneys are operating side by side in any or
all geographic areas that a particular program serves, there may be a
tendency to have private attorneys handle those cases that they have
traditionally handled (i e., non-poverty law cases) and to have staff at-
torneys continue to handle those cases rarely handled by private attor-
neys (ie., poverty law cases). 13' At first blush, this tendency seems
logical. There are many reasons for using private attorneys on non-
poverty law cases only. Many traditional poverty law cases (e.g., pub-
lic benefit claims) do not require an attorney; they may be handled
most economically by staff paralegals. Few private attorneys are famil-
iar with poverty law and some probably have no desire to become fa-
miliar with it: they do not view expertise in poverty law as a way to
expand their practices. Even if private attorneys wish to become famil-
iar with poverty law, it is uneconomical for a legal services program to
pay them to learn poverty law when staff attorneys are already trained
in this area. Private attorneys often do not have the library materials
necessary to handle poverty law cases. In an urban area, private attor-
neys' offices may be far from the agencies that deal with poverty law
cases and the attorneys may be unwilling to go to or be uncomfortable
in the agencies' offices, which are generally located in "bad" neighbor-
hoods. While most private attorneys are unfamiliar with poverty law
cases, they are very familiar with non-poverty law cases and issues, and
generally can become familiar with non-poverty law cases in a poverty
law context. Thus it seems most efficient and conducive to quality if
such as the Delivery Systems Study demonstration project, Bet Tzedek, which serves Eastern
European Jews in one area of Los Angeles, may serve these communities better than a
downtown or even a local staff office. The component may be more acceptable to the client
community. The component may serve the ethnic communities more economically than
legal services staffed offices since the need for interpreters and bilingual staff is eliminated.
Moreover, local private attorneys may be more expert in areas of unique concern to the
community (e.g., immigration of relatives from Russia) than staff attorneys. Finally. an
urban program can have all the advantages of an "open panel" without any danger of hav-
ing an unwieldy panel if it only has a "local panel" serving a distinct ethnic community.
A legal aid office that serves only a distinct ethnic community is part of the legal aid
tradition in this country. The first legal aid office in this country was established in New
York in 1876 to serve German immigrants. See supra note I & accompanying text.
131. As used in this Article, "poverty law" encompasses cases arising in those areas of
the law that only affect poor people (e.g., cases involving compensatory and bilingual educa-
tion programs: public benefit programs, including medicaid: public and subsidized housing:
employment training programs; and access to and quality of health care) and cases that
rarely arise except for poor people, although the basic legal issues would be the same
whether the clients were rich or poor (e.g., cases involving debt collection practices: unin-
sured motorist liability; termination of utilities).
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private attorneys only handle non-poverty law cases. Further, if a goal
of a private attorney delivery system is the elimination of "separate but
equal" treatment for poor people, cases that are the same or substan-
tially similar whether one is rich or poor (ie., non-poverty law cases)
should be handled in the same or in a substantially similar manner for
rich or poor people, that is; by private lawyers.' 32
There are also many reasons, however, why it is desirable to have
private attorneys work on poverty law cases in addition to non-poverty
law cases. Private attorneys can bring a fresh approach and enthusiasm
to such cases. They may feel outrage when faced with a welfare "Catch
22," for example,133 and may be ready to do battle when staff attorneys
faced with the same problem may only feel resignation at a typical bu-
reaucratic problem. 34 Workers in poverty agencies may be more likely
132. There is one category of non-poverty law cases that may seem inappropriate to
refer to private attorneys. In urban areas, many legal services programs have developed
efficient techniques for processing routine non-poverty law cases such as uncontested di-
vorces. See Johnson, supra note 36, at 153. For example, the Legal Assistance Foundation
of Chicago (LAFC) has a centralized divorce division that has handled as many as 1,500
cases a year with a limited staff. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN LEGAL SERVICES DELIVERY
SYSTEMS: AN OVERVIEW 7 (Delivery Research Unit, LSC, Sept. 1982) [hereinafter cited as
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS]. It may seem best for legal services staff attorneys to continue to
handle those non-poverty law cases since they can be handled so economically. Neverthe-
less, this "assembly-line" handling of cases is precisely the "separate but equal" or inferior
treatment about which judicare proponents complain. To eliminate this complaint, it may
be best to have private attorneys handle even these routine cases. This approach has been
adopted by LAFC, which will continue to have staff attorneys screen applicants for financial
eligibility and grounds for divorce. Staff attorneys will also prepare case files with form
pleadings. The files will then be given in groups of 20 to private attorneys who will handle
the cases for considerably less than their usual fee. Id. See also DSS POLICY REPORT, supra
note I1, at app. A-23 (describing a demonstration project, West Texas Legal Services, that
similarly contracted with private attorneys to handle divorces for which staff had done all
the paperwork).
Alternatively, a program that desires to preseve the efficiencies of assembly-line
processing of routine non-poverty law cases, while involving the private bar in the handling
of such cases, can contract with private legal aid clinics that also have developed or may
develop efficient assembly-line techniques. This has been the approach of two rural pro-
grams, Colorado Rural Legal Services and Southern New Mexico Legal Services, which
have contracted with private non-profit legal clinics. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS, supra, at 11.
While a rich client may never be subjected to the assembly-line techniques of private legal
clinics, middle class clients are exposed to this process. See DSS POLICY REPORT, supra
note 11, at app. A-52. The poor would thus receive the same treatment as that received by
the middle class.
133. See, e.g., Adkins v. Leach, 17 Cal. App. 3d 771, 95 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1971) (discussing
the requirement of the Monterey County, California, welfare department that one must have
an address to obtain welfare even though the penniless plaintiffs living in their automobile
could not rent an apartment, and thus get an address, without the money to make a deposit).
134. See Swanson, Judicare:.A Close Look at Two Programs, 37 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE
104, 113 (1980).
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to respond positively to private attorneys who are not perceived as fel-
low bureaucrats or "young radicals" than to staff attorneys who are
perceived as such. This is particularly true in rural areas where the
workers may know and respect the participating private attorneys. Pri-
vate attorneys become sensitized to the problems of the poor and the
failings of many poverty agencies and programs when they are con-
fronted with some poverty law cases. Sensitizing private attorneys,
who often are powerful politically, could, in the long run, be of great
advantage to the poor.135
There is no reason to assume that private attorneys' poverty law
work will be a lower quality than staffs. The Delivery Systems Study
quality ratings for each type of case shows no significant difference in
quality between the staff attorney projects' and pure judicare projects'
handling of, inter alia, income maintenance, consumer finance, divorce.
or housing cases.136
In summary, there is no reason to restrict private attorneys to non-
poverty law cases and it is recommended that they should not be so
restricted. Similarly, it is recommended that private attorneys should
not be restricted to traditional modes of advocacy. To the extent that
legal services programs may engage in legislative and administrative
lobbying, participating private attorneys should also engage in such ad-
vocacy. After all, some private attorneys have been acting as lobbyists
for their clients for years. Private attorneys can also engage in all of the
other activities that staff attorneys engage in, including assisting in
community education efforts and representing client groups. 37 Exper-
135. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note I1, at app. A-9; Martin, supra note 85. at 503.
136. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 128 & table 25. As noted. "[p]reliminary
results of the analysis of the relationship between . . . quality and type of attorney [salaried
staffor private] handling a case indicates that. . . the type of attorney handling the case [is]
not [a] major factor affecting the scores on quality of services." Id. at 124. Moreover, cer-
tain poverty law cases may be better handled by private attorneys. For example. private
attorneys who practice in worker's compensation or in personal injury may be highly skilled
in cases involving disability claims. They can probably be taught the relevant law in a social
security disability case considerably faster than a staff attorney can be taught the techniques
they have developed to establish injury or to cross-examine doctors. To cite another exam-
ple, a real estate or tax lawyer may see issues in a subsidized housing case that a poverty
lawyer would never consider. Finally, there are increasing numbers of private attorneys
who are familiar with poverty law. Some have been staff attorneys in legal services pro-
grams during the more than 20 years that such programs have existed or have worked in a
poverty law setting as law students through participation in law school clinical programs.
work-study jobs with legal services programs, or volunteer activities. Some have taken pov-
erty law courses in law school. See Dooley & Houseman, supra note 86, at 716; Martin.
supra note 85, at 504.
137. Indeed. certain client groups, such as those wishing to incorporate or to develop
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ienced private attorneys can help train younger attorneys, both private
and staff, and can help with quality control efforts.138
In deciding the range of participating private attorneys' work, a
legal services program need not think only in terms of types of cases
and service, but also may think in terms of types of clients. For exam-
ple, private attorneys could work exclusively for elderly or handi-
capped clients. Working for such clients may be far more attractive to
private attorneys than working for other poor clients who may not be
perceived as "worthy" of free assistance.139 While special clients, such
as the elderly or the handicapped, often have special problems in areas
of law beyond the expertise of most private attorneys, these attorneys
may be willing to develop an expertise in these areas of the law because
not all the elderly or the handicapped are poor.
Whatever decision a legal services program makes regarding the
scope of service of its private bar component, the staff component
should continue to handle at least a sampling of all types of cases, to
serve all types of clients, and to provide all types of services. Only by
doing this will staff attorneys keep abreast of the law, be aware of
problems arising in certain kinds of cases, be able to develop efficient
and effective case-handling techniques, and be able to adequately su-
pervise private attorney work.
The Intake Process
In order to preserve the strengths of the staffed office system, all
eligibility determinations and case intake' 4° must be done by the
subsidized housing, may be better assisted by a private attorney who works regularly with
corporations or is a real estate specialist than by a staff attorney.
138. Programs that have used private attorneys in some or all of these capacities have
been successful. See, e.g., PRIVATE BAR INVOLVEMENT, EVALUATION REPORT, LSC QUALI-
TY IMPROVEMENT PROJECT (1981) (favorably evaluates two quality improvement demon-
stration projects that used private attorneys for training, co-counseling with staff, and case
review of staff work).
139. Retired or semi-retired attorneys may be willing to work with the elderly when they
would not otherwise work with legal services programs, although it should be noted that the
LSC quality improvement projects that were staffed by retired private attorneys were not
considered successful by the LSC. Id. Using private attorneys for delivery of services to the
elderly may aid a legal services program in getting additional funds through the Older
Americans Act, which provides funds for legal services projects that serve the elderly. The
Act provides that each area agency should "attempt to involve the private bar in legal serv-
ices activities authorized. . . including groups within the private bar furnishing services to
older individuals on a pro bono and reduced fee basis." Older Americans Act
§ 307(a)(15)(A)(iii), 42 U.S.C. § 3027(a)(15)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1981).
140. As used herein, the term "eligibility determination" refers to a consideration of
financial, residential, and other such criteria which determine an applicant's eligibility for
free legal services. The term "case intake" refers to the process of reviewing the eligible
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staffed legal services office. There are several reasons for this
conclusion.
Eligibility Determinations
Wisconsin Judicare uses independent outside agencies for case in-
take. 41 This is not a good idea. Clients with complaints against the
agency may be hesitant to apply for legal assistance or may be discour-
aged by the agency from applying for legal services. Even when the
client's problem is unrelated to the agency he or she may be hesitant to
go to certain outside agencies seeking legal services or may be discour-
aged by certain agencies from seeking legal services.'
42
If eligibility determinations are done by outside agencies, there is a
danger that clients will not be instructed adequately as to the nature of
the program and the opportunity to file a grievance. There is also a
danger that agency personnel, untrained in the law, will be giving legal
advice. Agency personnel may be overworked already and may resent
applicant's legal problem(s) to determine if assistance will be provided and the nature of the
assistance. The term "intake" refers to both eligibility determinations and case intake.
141. Under the Wisconsin Judicare system, an applicant seeks a certification of eligibil-
ity for legal services from any of several independent agencies, such as welfare departments.
If the agency staff determines that the applicant is eligible for free legal services, he or she is
issued a judicare card which entitles the recipient to the free services of any participating
attorney he or she chooses. The chosen attorney will do case intake, as there is no case
intake at the time a card is issued. The program only reviews the eligibility determinations
after the private attorney completes case intake. G. POTACK, INTAKE AND CASE AssIcN-
MENT SYSTEM UTILIZED BY WISCONSIN JUDICARE 2 (Office of Field Services, LSC. Apr.
1981).
A variant of the Wisconsin System is used by Northwest Minnesota Legal Services. A
client applies for a card from any of several outside agencies, but the card is issued only by
staff, which reviews all applications. Swanson, supra note 134, at 107.
142. While Brakel stated that there was no evidence from his study of Wisconsin Judi-
care that this was the case, there are disturbing indications in his study that using outside
agencies for eligibility determinations may discourage applications for legal services. S.
BRAKEL, WISCONSIN JUDICARE,supra note 15, at 42-43. For example, 16 out of 47 Wiscon-
sin Judicare cardholders stated they "did not feel comfortable about going to places like
welfare. Id. at 42. In one county, the poor "expressed many reservations about the local
welfare department." Id at 41. Welfare officials in this county "made it a practice to dis-
courage applicants from going to a lawyer when they knew the problem at hand fell outside
the scope of the program." Id. at 44. The head of the welfare department in this county
"emphatically" stated, as reported by Brakel, that "'awareness [of judicarel was more than
sufficient, implying, in fact, that there was too much of it, that it exceeded the ethic of mod-
esty according to which poor people should be decently grateful for the bounties bestowed
on them. ... Id at 27. Brakel minimized these problems by saying that if clients felt
hesitant about or had problems with one agency, such as this county welfare department.
there was generally another agency to which they could go. Id. at 42. This may no longer
be the case. Many social agencies are being eliminated or sharply cut back by the Reagan
Administration. See generaly Dooley & Houseman, supra note 86, at 704.
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adding legal services responsibilities to their jobs. This resentment may
adversely affect legal services clients. Furthermore, legal services pro-
grams may have difficulties controlling and supervising the work of
outside agencies, particularly when the agencies may be adversaries in
some legal services cases. Finally, if one agency or office determines
eligibility while another handles case intake and still another provides
the service to the applicant, the poor are forced into a bureaucratic
shuffle between agencies. 143
Accordingly, eligibility determinations should not be done by
outside agencies. They should similarly not be done by the participat-
ing private attorneys. First, while this would not be the case for all
private attorneys, some private attorneys, having a financial stake in
eligibility, may find some ineligible clients to be eligible. Second, it
may be unpleasant for private attorneys, particularly those who are
sympathetic enough with poor people to work with a legal services pri-
vate bar component, to have to turn down a client. 44 Private attorneys
should not be made into the "bad guys." Third, relieving participating
private attorneys of eligibility determination responsibility serves to re-
duce the paper work required of them. Finally, it is important that the
legal services program's staff attorneys have the initial contact with the
143. On the other hand, the director of Wisconsin Judicare, Gene Potack, feels that the
use of outside agencies expands knowledge of the program in the client community and is
salutary for that reason. G. POTACK, supra note 141, at 7. However, outside agencies could
publicize the program without handling eligibility determinations, as is done by many
outside agencies. Potack also feels that when outside agencies do eligibility determinations
they gain a better understanding of legal services. Id at 6. However, this understanding can
be gained in other ways, without the disadvantages of outside agency eligibility determina-
tions. Further, Potack feels that using many local outside agencies increases access to legal
services and that the local outside agencies become local resources for the program. Id
Finally, Potack feels that using outside agencies saves money because a major administra-
tive task is done for nothing. Id
Another argument in favor of using outside agencies is that judicare programs which
use outside agencies may issue eligibility cards good for a certain period of time even when
an individual does not have a legal problem (somewhat like a pre-paid insurance system)
and that possession of a card is a psychological comfort to the individuals who receive them.
S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE, supra note 15, at 32. Of course, knowing one is eligible for free legal
services may be just as much comfort as possessing a card.
Finally, it has been suggested that even if using outside agencies discourages some ap-
plicants for legal services, those who do not apply for legal services when eligibility determi-
nations are done by outside agencies because they do not like the agencies may also dislike
legal services programs and may not apply for services from them. Indeed, they may not
like applying for "handouts" of any sort. [d at 42. There are those, however, who would
seek legal services from a legal services program but who would not seek them from the
outside agencies issuing judicare cards.
144. Indeed, Wisconsin Judicare attorneys rarely refused cases. S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE,
supra note 15, at 45.
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client to ensure that clients are aware of how the program operates and
of how to register complaints. This initial contact by staff attorneys
also ensures that clients are aware of the important role of staff.
Case intake
A compelling reason for having staff attorneys do all case intake is
the finding of the Delivery Systems Study that poverty law issues are
more likely to be addressed when staff attorneys do case intake. 45 If
staff attorneys are identifying the issues and shaping the cases, a pro-
cess that invariably occurs at the time of case intake, poverty law and
impact issues should not be ignored. Indeed, program priorities in gen-
eral are more likely to be addressed. 46
Even if private attorneys are made aware of clearly established
program priorities, with private attorney intake cases more likely
would be considered in light of the individual biases of the private at-
torney doing intake. 47 Institutionalized case intake done by staff attor-
neys does not ensure the elimination of biases and the pure application
of program priorities, but staff attorneys may have personalized pro-
gram priorities, which they presumably helped develop. At a mini-
mum, they should be more aware of and in agreement with these
priorities than private attorneys. 148
A staff intake system also allows staff attorneys to develop and
revise priorities in a manner consistent with changing community
needs. Through intake, staff attorneys acquire an up-to-date sense of
the legal needs and priority areas in the community. Moreover, staff
145. In addition to issuing the DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, the LSC issued
several "'research notes" which analyzed the available data from the Delivery Systems Study
in greater depth than in the policy report. These research notes, which are available from
the LSC, will hereinafter be referred to herein as DSS Research Notes. The finding referred
to herein was in such a research note.
146. The Legal Services Corporation Act mandates that legal services programs estab-
lish priorities. The LSC is required to "insure that recipients, consistent with goals estab-
lished by the Corporation, adopt procedures for determining and implementing prionties for
the provision of such assistance, taking into account the relative needs of eligible clients for
such assistance .... .- Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 1007(a)(2)(C)(i). 42 U.S.C.
§ 2996f(a)(2)(C)(i) (1976). See Breger. supra note 58, at 315-17. for a discussion of LSC prior-
ity setting. Even if there were no statutory requirement that a legal services program estab-
lish priorities, a program with limited resources and many requests for its services would
necessarily have to establish some priorities. See generall id at 294-95.
147. Breger, supra note 58, at 322-24.
148. The Private Attorney Involvement Instruction. supra note 23, may be interpreted to
mandate staff intake for these reasons. It provides that systems "designed to provide direct
services to clients by private attorneys. . . shall include at a minimum . . . : (1) Intake ...
procedures which are consistent with the recipient's established priorities in meeting the
legal needs of eligible clients." 46 Fed. Reg. 61,018 (1981).
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intake enables staff attorneys to identify the widespread problems re-
quiring broad solutions and to identify and develop the means to deal
with repetitive legal problems.
Even those judicare proponents who question the wisdom of law
reform and who feel that the clients should set priorities in the tradi-
tional attorney-client relationship, still accept the need for equitable
distribution of legal resources. 49 Staff intake should lead to this equi-
table distribution, whereas private attorney intake may foster unequal
distribution. As stated by two social scientists who studied a judicare
program with private attorney case intake:
Judicare is essentially an uncontrollable system-or nonsystem. It is
uncontrollable because the supply of services is dependent on the
separate, autonomous and unpredictable decisions of hundreds of
scattered private lawyers as to whether they will handle given num-
bers and types of clients and cases . . . . Without an enforceable
quota system, the potential for unequal distribution of services would
persist .... 150
The Delivery Systems Study also found that staff intake leads to better
cost and quality control.15 1 Indeed, it may well be that there can be no
effective monitoring of legal work and no quality control without staff
intake.152
With staff intake, staff attorneys can establish and shape, from the
outset, the attorney-client relationship between the program and the
client. With staff intake, the case acceptance standards can be applied
rationally and uniformly. Moreover, staff will have more information
at hand when it applies these standards. 153 Without staff intake, little
can be known about a case at the time of approval or disapproval; the
most complete form or longest memo can only tell so much about a
case.154 With staff intake, rational and uniform case referral decisions
149. Brakel has strongly asserted that legal services programs should not be doing law
reform work and rather should be responding to individual requests for legal services.
Brakel,.supra note 20, at 821. Nevertheless, he has devoted a chapter of his book onjudicare
to the "serious" problem of unequal distribution of services. S. BRAKEL, JUDICARE, supra
note 15, ch. 5.
150. Goodman & Feuillan, supra note 15, at 481.
151. DSS Research Notes, supra note 145.
152. See infra notes 183-93 & accompanying text for a discussion of quality control.
153. As discussed, only staff should make the decision to accept or reject a case. See
supra notes 141-44 & accompanying text.
154. The problems inherent in approving a case based on a form or memo from a pri-
vate attorney are amply demonstrated by a West Virginia Legal Services Plan case. In 1977,
staff attorneys approved a case which the private attorney described as a landlord-tenant
case involving the defense of a habitability claim. However, the client was the landlord and
the tenant was represented by another legal services program. Since that case, West Virginia
has switched to a staff intake system. Martin, supra note 85, at 501 n.4.
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can be made. As noted by two attorneys familiar with combined pri-
vate and staff attorney programs: "Experience indicates that extensive
information intake personnel are able to compile about cases as a result
of centralized intake procedures results directly in more effective
matches between attorneys and clients."' 55 Such matching is particu-
larly important if a program has an open panel, as has been advocated
in this Article. 56
Staff intake is also viewed favorably by private attorneys who un-
derstand its value. Private attorneys do not want to feel that cases or
clients are merely being "dumped" on them without thought; they ap-
preciate receiving cases in which the facts are developed, that are accu-
rately presented, and that are clearly meritorious. 1-57 They appreciate
pre-screening which permits them to begin legal work on appropriate
cases immediately. 58 Even if some private attorneys do not always
like staff intake, they recognize the need for it. 159 Finally, staff intake
permits a program to integrate its staff and private bar components.
The advantages of a combined system can easily by lost if a program,
in effect, operates two separate delivery systems. 60
As has been shown, there are numerous advantages to staff in-
take. 16' There are disadvantages, however. In a rural program, staff
155. E. LARDENT & I. COWEN, QUALITY CONTROL IN PRIVATE BAR PROGRAMS FOR
THE ELDERLY 4 (Draft I, ABA Comm'n on Legal Problems of the Elderly) (available from
the LSC).
156. See supra notes 131-39 & accompanying text. Such "matching" may be required
by the Private Bar Involvement Instruction, supra note 23, which provides that systems
"designed to provide direct services to clients by private attorneys . . . shall include at a
minimum . . . case assignment procedures which ensure the referral of cases according to
the nature of the legal problem or problems involved and the skills, experience and substan-
tive expertise of the participating attorneys." 46 Fed. Reg. 61,018 (1981).
157. Comments of Sara Ann Determan at the 59th Annual National Legal Aid and
Defenders Association Conference, San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 16-19, 1981, reproduced in
NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDERS ASS'N (NLADA), PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL SERVICES
AND THE PRIVATE BAR: 1982 AND BEYOND (1982) [hereinafter cited as NLADA 1982].
158. Martin, supra note 80, at 261.
159. Comments of David Brink, then President of the American Bar Association, at the
59th Annual National Legal Aid and Defenders Association Conference, San Francisco,
Cal., Dec. 16-19, 1981, reproduced in NLADA 1982, supra note 157.
160. Martin, supra note 80, at 261.
161. In addition, when staff attorneys do the intake, many clients' problems can be re-
solved through referrals to social agencies or through simple advice. A referral to a private
attorney becomes unnecessary, creating a substantial savings even if private attorneys are
only allowed to bill a small amount for "brief service" or "advice only" cases. Moreover,
private attorneys may not be familiar with the various social agencies to which legal services
clients may be referred and may not wish to refer a client to these agencies, either because
they wish to pursue the client's case or because they do not approve of certain agencies or of
certain types of "charity." Similarly, they may not be equipped to give the simple advice
intake may require substantial telephone intake or costly and time con-
suming "circuit riding." Rural staff may not be equipped to respond to
an emergency occurring at a distant location. Staff of rural and urban
programs alike will probably spend more time on intake and less on
handling cases if a private bar component with staff intake is estab-
lished. This increased burden may seriously affect staff attorney mo-
rale. Staff attorney morale may similarly be affected by the burden of
increased paper work. All program clients will be treated differently
than the paying clients of private attorneys, who are not subjected to
institutionalized intake procedures.
These disadvantages, however, cannot outweigh the advantages of
staff intake. Staff intake is a crucial part of any combined private and
staff attorney legal services delivery system. Only with staff intake can
the potential of such a delivery system be maximized.1 62
The Case Approval Process
It is also essential to the functioning of a combined staff and pri-
vate attorney delivery system that only staff attorneys have case ap-
proval powers, tie., that private attorneys do not proceed with any case
unless their representation is authorized by staff attorneys. Even tradi-
tional judicare programs with private attorney intake (e.g., Wisconsin
Judicare) agree on this point. 63 Controlling costs and developing an
effective system to encumber, reserve, or set aside funds necessary to
pay private attorneys on referred cases (an "encumbrance system") has
been difficult for many programs using compensated private attor-
that staff attorneys can give due to their greater experience with certain types of problems or
they may be unwilling to treat certain cases as "advice only" cases. Finally, freeing partici-
pating private attorneys from "brief service" cases that may entail more paperwork than
financial rewards could be advantageous. Private attorneys may not long participate in a
program if they are beseiged with non-renumerative "advice only" cases.
162. A staff intake system cannot succeed without thoroughness in the actual intake pro-
cess. Information obtained from intake is all a program has to decide whether to accept a
case, whether a staff or a private attorney should handle a case, and which private attorney
should handle it if it is decided to refer it out. Information obtained from intake may be all
a program has to assess a private attorney's performance. Complete intake memos, herein-
after referred to as "opening memos," should thus be prepared in all cases. Such memos not
only aid in making uniform and reasonable case approval and case referral decisions, but
also serve as a record of the nature of the case, the legal issues, and the objectives (as per-
ceived by staff) for quality control and quality assessment purposes. Moreover, where cases
are referred to private attorneys, giving them opening memos can save private attorneys'
time and can make them aware of poverty law issues which might otherwise be ignored.
Such memos will give them useful guidance, particularly in cases involving poverty law and
general law with poverty law aspects.
163. G. POTACK, supra note 141, at 10.
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neys. 164 Without central case approval, it may be impossible. 165 Ap-
plying uniform case acceptance standards and implementing program
goals and priorities have similarly been difficult. Without central case
approval, they may also be impossible. 166
Cases may be approved for representation before or after they are
first referred to a private attorney. That is, a program can approve a
case unconditionally after intake and then refer it to a private attorney
or a program can withhold approval of a case that is going to be re-
ferred to a private attorney until the attorney has seen the client, re-
viewed the case, and made an assessment of the case. Private attorneys
may be obligated to accept or, conversely, free to refuse any referred
case. Final case approval may depend on reaching a fee agreement
with a referred private attorney. Whatever the resolution of these case
approval issues, however, there can be no doubt about the disposition
of final case acceptance authority. Only staff attorneys may approve
cases for program representation. 167
The Case Referral Process
After a case has been approved for program representation, 168 it
must be decided who will handle the case: a staff or a private attorney.
If handled by a private attorney, a decision must be made as to which
private attorney will handle it. The first decision must primarily be
made based on the factors discussed previously. 69 However, the deci-
sion may also be based on the complexities of an individual case, the
time the case will consume, and the relative economies of staff or pri-
164. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at app. A-19. See also Martin, supra note 80.
at 264.
165. Martin, supra note 85, at 502.
166. See supra notes 146-48 & accompanying text.
167. The case approval system developed by Legal Services of Arkansas (a combined
private and staff attorney program), as described in L. POWERS, INTAKE AND CASE ASSIGN-
MENT SYSTEMS USED BY LEGAL SERVICES OF ARKANSAS (Office of Field Services, LSC.
1981), may be the best system. Each case is "approved" for representation by the program
(the "program" encompasses both staff and participating private attorneys) before any as-
signment is made to staff or a private attorney. If a case is referred to a private attorney, the
private attorney must submit a fee estimate immediately after the initial client interview.
This estimate must be approved by the program before the attorney's representation is au-
thorized.
Winona Read, an attorney familiar with staff and private bar programs, recommends
that private attorneys submit written fee estimates in all cases. Presumably a case would not
be approved until the estimate was approved. Read, Private Bar Conracts for Civil Legal
Services-The Advantages & Pitfalls, 38 N.L.A.D.A. BRIEFCASE 93, 97 (1981).
168. "Advice only" or "brief service" cases are not considered herein to be approved for
program representation even if some of these cases are referred to private attorneys.
169. See supra notes 125-50 & accompanying text.
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vate attorney representation on the particular case. 170 Client choice
should also play a large part in making this decision. The freedom of
choice aspects of judicare will be lost if the staff attorneys alone make
this decision.' 71
The client should also have a role in the second decision. If it has
been decided that a private attorney should handle the case, in an effort
to preserve the freedom of choice aspect of judicare, the client should
be offered the opportunity to select his or her own attorney from the list
of suitable private attorneys. 172 If the client expresses no preference,
staff attorneys should select a private attorney for the client by applying
rational criteria. That is, staff should match attorneys and cases and
should not select attorneys by rotation except when there are several
equally acceptable attorneys. 73 There are several reasons for this
recommendation.
First, with an open panel it is difficult to ensure quality unless case
referrals are carefully controlled. Second, a rational case referral sys-
tem ensures that each private attorney's caseload is maintained at an
appropriate level. Third, private attorneys with demonstrated expertise
or expressed interest in certain areas of the law can be referred cases in
these areas, and, conversely, private attorneys with no ability or interest
in certain areas or who are likely to have conflicts of interest in certain
areas will not be burdened with referrals of cases in those areas.
With a rational case referral system, private attorneys may fear
bias or favoritism in referrals, but a legal services program should be
able to demonstrate to the participating private attorneys that a ra-
tional case referral system, with opportunity for client choice and with
some rotation, is in their best interest. Under such a system, they can
have control over the size of their legal services caseload without hav-
ing to solicit or turn down clients. The distribution of work may ulti-
mately be more fair with a rational referral system than with a pure
170. West Virginia Legal Services Plan also makes this decision based on whether a staff
or a private attorney is more readily available and on the number of referrals in each geo-
graphical area served by the program. In other words, it has a yearly quota of referrals for
each area, based on the size of the area's poor population. Martin, supra note 85, at 501.
17 1. Clients may very well prefer staff representation. In an experiment in Connecticut
where clients were given a choice of using a staff attorney office or a judicare system, 72%
chose to go to the staffed office. For landlord/tenant or welfare cases they chose the staffed
office in 89% and in 91% of the cases, respectively. See generally Cole & Greenberger, supra
note 15, at 707.
172. The client should also be given the opportunity to reject any of the participating
attorneys. If an attorney is rejected by a client, the program should determine why and
retain this information for use in making subsequent referrals.
173. As mentioned, such matching may be required by the LSC. See supra note 156.
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choice or rotation system in which, for example, one attorney could end
up with several time-consuming cases while another attorney ended up
with no meritorious cases. Furthermore, private attorneys are far more
likely to get cases in which they have an interest or expertise when
there is a rational case referral system.
Payment of Private Attorneys
Most of the compensated private bar delivery systems that are
mentioned in this Article or that were part of the Delivery Systems
Study pay or paid participating private attorneys less than the custom-
ary rate for their services, generally one-third to one-half the private
attorneys' usual rate.' 74 As noted in the DSS Policy Report, private
attorneys participated in legal services programs, despite the low pay-
ments to them, because: 1) they felt assured of payment without collec-
tion difficulties; 2) even a low payment generally covered overhead;
and 3) they could represent the poor without monetary loss.175
Whatever fees are set for private attorney representation of legal
services clients, it is recommended that these fees be paid on an hourly
basis with limits on payments set according to the type of case in-
volved. 176 A program also must have a clear and simple method for
waiving whatever fee limits it has established in order to minimize the
possibility that the fee limits discourage quality or impact work.
77
One design question of great importance to a combined program is
what should be done with court-awarded attorneys' fees when such fees
are awarded in cases handled by private attorneys. 178 These fees may
be quite substantial, particularly in major civil rights cases., 79 There
174. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 90; Read, supra note 106, at 231.
175. DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at app. A-19.
176. This recommendation is made based on the DSS Research Note which concluded
that such a fee schedule leads to the best cost control. The Delivery Systems Study found
that when only a maximum is set and/or there is no requirement that attorneys itemize their
bills, attorneys tended to charge the maximum. DSS Research Notes, supra note 145. And.
when only hourly rates with no maxima were used, costs tended to be higher. 1d.
177. Impact work may be encouraged by paying a premium rate for such work. Paying
such premium rates may make impact assignments far more attractive and acceptable. The
premium need not be large; five or ten dollars per hour would do, but even such a small
premium would have a psychological impact on private attorneys. Similarly. a premium
rate may be paid for appeals.
178. While LSC funded programs may not accept fee-generating cases, Legal Services
Corporation Act of 1974 § 1007(b)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(b)(l) (1976), they may represent
clients who seek statutory benefits in fee-generating cases where "appropriate private repre-
sentation is not available," id. Further, many cases in which attorneys' fees may be awarded
(e.g., divorces) are not considered fee-generating.
179. See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 20 Cal. 3d 25, 569 P.2d 1303, 141 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1977)
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are several ways to deal with such court-awarded fees. Some programs
require the private attorneys to turn over all of those fees to the pro-
gram, but this serves as a disincentive to collect such fees. Private at-
torneys could be given a choice of opting for possible court-awarded
fees or for legal services payments initially. Alternatively, in certain
kinds of cases where attorney's fees may be awarded, such as Social
Security cases, a program may act as a guarantor. 80 Prairie State Le-
gal Services paid attorneys for their work as agreed but asked the attor-
neys to assign their rights to court-awarded attorney's fees to the
program.18' While this eliminates the disincentive problem, it may
force the program to engage in burdensome, and sometimes costly, col-
lection efforts. As a compromise, private attorneys could be paid for
their work on referred cases and allowed to collect court-awarded fees,
but required to give one-third to one-half of the awarded fees back to
the program, perhaps for a special fund.' 82 This appears to be the best
arrangement since it gives attorneys an incentive to seek fees, but
neither deprives the program of fees nor places a burden on staff to
collect them.
Ensuring Quality of Service
It is important that the legal work of any legal services delivery
system be of the highest possible quality. 8 3 All quality control efforts
are directed to this end. While many proponents of a staffed office sys-
tem would argue that one can only have effective quality control with a
staffed system, this is not the case. Quality control is often more diffi-
cult with private attorneys than with staff,184 but this does not mean
that no quality control efforts over private attorneys should be at-
tempted. It simply means that quality control efforts for the private bar
component may be different than those for the staff component and
(a legal services program and a private public interest law firm were awarded $800,000 in
attorneys fees).
180. Under Wisconsin Judicare's guarantor system, if an attorney is awarded fees, he or
she accepts the fees and receives no payment from Judicare. If he or she is not awarded fees,
he or she will receive a payment from Judicare. Minneapolis Meeting Materials, supra note
93.
181. Id
182. Several programs have adopted this approach. Id
183. See Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974 § 1007(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 2996f(a)(l)
(1976) (requires that the LSC shall "insure the maintenance of the highest quality of
service").
184. See, e.g., W. READ & L. VOGT, QUALITY CONTROL IN PRO BONO AND JUDICARE
PROGRAMS 6 (LSC 1981) [hereinafter cited as DSS PROJECT DIRECTORS' REPORT]; Martin,
supra note 85, at 502; Swanson, Director Sees It, supra note 42, at 103.
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that existing staff programs cannot merely utilize their present quality
control methods with their new private bar components.
Quality Assurance Techniques
If a legal services program adopts the case intake, case approval,
case referral, and payment systems suggested in this Article, 1 5 it will
be taking important steps in assuring quality of private attorney work.
If staff does intake and if an opening memo which includes sugges-
tions on how to proceed with the case and possible deadlines is pre-
pared on every case and given to the private attorney assigned the case,
a program will have taken the first step in assuring the quality of work.
The program will be ensuring that issues are addressed and that dead-
lines are met--or at least that neither is missed because of lack of
information. 186
Requiring staff attorneys to approve the program's representation
of any client is a second step. Such staff approval ensures uniform and
thoughtful decisionmaking.
The suggested rational case referral system is a third step in assur-
ing quality. Cases can be referred to attorneys known for their reliabil-
ity or for their expertise in a relevant area of the law. Moreover, a case
may be referred to a private attorney with a staff attorney co-counsel or
a known experienced private attorney co-counsel.
The payment system can be used as a further step towards effective
quality control. The Delivery Systems Study concluded that there was
better quality control in demonstration projects that required attorneys
185. See supra notes 145-77 & accompanying text.
186. Staff intake may also contribute to the quality assurance system in other ways.
First, sample pleadings and checklists for each case may be sent to the attorney along with
the opening memo. Second, if the program is aware that a case requires research or investi-
gation, offers of paralegal or law student assistance may be made. Also, "significant cases"
may be tagged at intake and extensive review of these cases planned. This system is used by
Legal Aid of Southwest Missouri. Minneapolis Meeting Materials, supra note 93. A "tick-
ler" or "tracking" system may be designed which is geared to target individual or specific
types of cases. Staff can "tickle" cases for known deadlines or for dates when a reasonable
attorney working a reasonable amount on a particular case would have completed the work.
The tracking system may be elaborate for certain types of cases where it is felt more supervi-
sion is required and simple for types of cases where it is felt little supervision is required.
Indeed, staff may decide not to track certain types of cases at all. Finally, at the time of staff
intake, staff may make it clear to the client that he or she should come to staff with problems
and questions. Thus, the client can help the program ensure quality on each case. More-
over, if a program believes it is necessary to obtain a release or retainer agreement from the
client to permit it to review the private attorney's work on the client's case and to obtain
confidential information from the attorney, such a release or retainer may be signed at
intake.
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to bill on a per-hour basis.187 With such billing, attorneys must ac-
count for their time and provide detailed information to staff. Such
billing, however, will only serve as a quality assurance device if billing
is done before the conclusion of a case. Programs should establish a
monthly billing system as well. The monthly bill provides a monthly
case activity report to staff.' 88
There are other ways to use the payment system as a quality assur-
ance device. For example, a program may closely review all cases in
which a fee estimate or approved fee is being approached or in which
requests to waive fee maxima have been made. Also, the final bill can
serve as a "closing memo," detailing case results and activities and en-
closing final judgments and decisions. Closing approval may be with-
held until receipt of this bill.
There should be case review and reporting requirements apart
from those incorporated into the payment and other systems. Private
attorneys' files on individual cases may be regularly reviewed; regular
strategy sessions may be held on all or only on "significant" cases;
pleadings and significant documents in all or only in "significant" cases
may be reviewed before they can be filed; a report other than a final bill
may be required before closing is authorized. 189
187. DSS Research Notes, supra note 145.
188. Private attorneys should not consider the submission of such an activity report
overly onerous since it is connected to their billing. After al, monthly billing means
monthly payment and a better cash flow for the attorney. Wisconsin Judicare, on the other
hand, believes that monthly billing not only is onerous but also is costly for programs since
they lose out on the interest which would be earned on encumbered funds. See G. POTACK,
supra note 141, at 10. And, Legal Services of Northeastern Wisconsin, which gives attorneys
the option of submitting monthly or final bills, has found that few attorneys submit monthly
bills. Statement of John Cashman, Design for the 80's Conference, supra note 107.
189. These review and reporting requirements may seem onerous, but each contributes
to quality and can have other positive effects. The Delivery Systems Study demonstration
project directors concluded that such reviews and reporting requirements had a negative
effect on staff morale because of the paper work involved, but that such reviews also im-
proved staff work, built up better relationships with the private bar, and encouraged staff to
go to private attorneys for help when staff had cases within a private attorney's expertise.
DSS PROJECT DIRECTORs' REPORT, supra note 184, at 5. Regular contact with staff on
individual cases, moreover, impresses private attorneys with staffs concern for the client and
for the quality of the work and may increase their concern for both. E. LARDENT & I.
COWEN, supra note 155, at 4. In addition, staff review efforts may actually improve staff
morale, according to Esther Lardent, head of the Boston Volunteer Lawyer's Project. Refer-
ring out cases without having any role in them and without finding out what happens to
them can be deadly to morale. Having a continuing role in the cases can aid morale. Com-
ments of Esther Lardent at the 59th Annual National Legal Aid and Defenders Association
Conference, San Francisco, Cal., Dec, 16-19, 1981, reproduced in NLADA 1982, supra note
157.
While it has been suggested that private attorneys, particularly those who feel they are
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Two quality control devices do not involve formal or informal re-
views or reports. The first involves providing a private attorney with
technical assistance or support on a given case. Private attorneys
should feel free, and indeed should be encouraged, to seek such assist-
ance and support. Quality assurance efforts should not be resented if
they are seen as an integral part of requested assistance or support
efforts. 190
The second device involves the use of informal client complaints,
or even a formal client grievance procedure. While a grievance proce-
dure generally only reveals problems after they occur, it may also iden-
tify them before they occur. Clients should be encouraged to come to
staff as soon as and whenever they have a problem.
The quality control mechanisms suggested herein can be effective
and accepted by private attorneys as long as: 1) they are implemented
initially and not imposed after the system is operational; 2) participat-
ing attorneys understand, when they agree to participate in the private
only doing legal services work with its low pay because of their ethical responsibility to serve
the poor, will not tolerate such reviews, Swanson, Director Sees It, supra note 42, at 103.
others have stated that the private bar will accept such reviews as long as they do not feel as
if they are being singled out and as long as the reviews are conducted as part of a serious
commitment to quality rather than as mere rote behavior, Comments of David Brink, Sara
Ann Determan, and Esther Lardent at the 59th Annual National Legal Aid and Defenders
Conference, San Francisco, Cal., Dec. 16-19, 1981, reproduced in NLADA 1982, supra note
157. Such case reviews should not cause ethical problems. While it is generally considered
unethical for a third party to intervene between an attorney and his or her client and to
interfere with case handling, MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-107,
EC 2-33 (1979), it is not unethical for one attorney in a "firm" to review another's work.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 334 (1974). Indeed, such
reviews, rather than being considered impermissible interference, are considered to be "not
only permissible but salutory." Id. With the suggested design (including staff intake, staff
case approval, and staff case referral), participating private attorneys should be considered
members of the same "firm" as staff attorney reviewers for case monitoring purposes.
Similarly, while it would generally be considered unethical for an attorney to reveal
confidential communications from his or her client to another, MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1979), it would not be considered unethical for an
attorney to reveal confidential information to a supervising attorney or another member of
his or her "firm," particularly where, as under the suggested intake system, the supervising
attorney or other firm members were themselves in receipt of confidential information from
the client.
190. If technical assistance is provided by paralegals or law students, it not only may be
effective quality assurance but also may be economical. Law students' and paralegals' serv-
ices may be obtained at far less cost than attorneys, even with the low legal services compen-
sation rate. Accordingly, Northern Minnesota Legal Services, a judicare program, has
developed a system whereby selected law students at the University of North Dakota do
research at the request of private attorneys (transmitted through the staff) for a small hourly
rate. Every research memo is provided to the requesting attorney and made available to
staff attorneys for the program's central research file. See Swanson, supra note 134, at 109.
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bar component, that they will be utilized; and 3) the staff appears help-
ful and anxious to be of assistance instead of displaying an- attitude of
mistrust towards private attorneys.
Quality Development Techniques
The most common and effective quality development technique is
training. Training events are particularly vital with regard to a private
bar component because private attorneys who otherwise might not
meet each other can have an opportunity to meet at training events.
They can exchange ideas and resolve mutual problems. Moreover, of-
fers of training are an effective recruitment device. Training can be
conducted informally through regional meetings or through develop-
ment of task forces. Training can also occur through co-counseling or
through quality control activities.
Another common and effective quality development technique is
the provision of resource materials. Private attorneys may be given or
lent books or periodicals for their libraries. They may be given access
to research files, pleading banks, and specially prepared materials, such
as desk manuals, checklists, and form pleadings. Also, they may re-
ceive newsletters that report on significant cases and how they were
handled or on common problems and how they were solved.' 9 '
Client follow-up systems can also be made part of a quality devel-
opment system.192 The DSS demonstration project directors stressed
the importance of client feedback to quality control. While they be-
lieved that clients could not judge the quality of legal work in all cir-
cumstances, clients could provide information on 1) case outcome, 2)
the way they were treated, 3) whether objectives or expectations were
fulfilled, 4) fee irregularities, and 5) unnecessary delays.193
Conclusion
Since the federal government began funding civil legal services for
191. Such newsletters can also give recognition to participating private attorneys. Such
recognition is important to the retention of attorneys.
192. While Legal Aid of Manitoba stopped asking clients for feedback after getting a
three percent return rate on the forms given to clients, Comments of Alan Finebilt, Deputy
Director of Legal Aid of Manitoba, Design for the 80's Conference, supra note 107, and
while the Delivery Systems Study had difficulty getting client response on quality of service,
DSS POLICY REPORT, supra note 11, at 105, other programs have had return rates on client
satisfaction forms or surveys that may not be large enough to permit valid statistical analysis
but are certainly large enough to aid in quality development, Martin, supra note 85, at 502
n.6 (West Virginia Legal Services Plan, Inc. had a 40% return rate on a random survey).
193. DSS PROJECT DIRECTORS' REPORT, supra note 184, at 6.
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the poor, advocates of a staffed office delivery system and advocates of
a private bar delivery system have been locked in a debate over which
is the best approach to providing those services. Now, when the entire
concept of federally funded legal services is being questioned, is no
time to continue such a divisive debate. The time has come for a
compromise.
A well designed and carefully implemented legal services delivery
system using both staff attorneys and the private bar can meet the
objectives sought by proponents of both delivery systems. Such a sys-
tem would have an open panel of participating private attorneys; would
have these participating private attorneys serving the program's entire
geographic area, handling all types of cases, and providing all kinds of
services; and would have staff attorneys also serving the program's en-
tire geographic area, handling all types of cases, and providing all
kinds of services for all kinds of clients. Of vital importance, such a
system would have staff attorneys doing all case intake, making all case
acceptance decisions, and referring all cases to a particular staff or pri-
vate attorney on the basis of rational criteria and not on a rotational or
random basis. Such a system would also include methods to assure and
to develop the quality of both staff and private attorney work, using its
case intake, case approval, case referral, and payment systems to this
end.
With such a system, the strengths of the staff attorney and the pri-
vate attorney models can be preserved and maximized. Most impor-
tant, with such a system, quality civil legal assistance to the poor can be
provided effectively and efficiently.
If the advocates of private bar and staffed office delivery systems
end their debate and, instead, join forces to make such a combined
delivery system a reality in this country, they may achieve a delivery
system that serves their ends and they may preserve the means to fund
it.
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